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This paper examines the evolution of exchange rate arrangements in East Asia’s
emerging market economies over the last 10 years. It considers both “official” and
“observed” exchange rate arrangements in these economies from an international
comparative perspective. By focusing on the roles of the dollar, the yen, and the euro
as anchor currencies for exchange rate stabilization, the paper claims that the dollar
played a dominant role as a de jureor de factoanchor for emerging East Asia until
the 1997–98 currency crisis. During the crisis, the dollar’s dominance naturally
declined in affected East Asia as a result of a general shift to more flexible exchange
rate arrangements. In the post-crisis period, the dollar has regained prominence in
some countries (notably in Malaysia), while its dominance has been reduced and
exchange rate flexibility has risen in others (notably in Indonesia). Interesting is the
observation that Korea and Thailand appear to have shifted to a de factocurrency
basket arrangement with significant weights on the dollar and the yen, similar to
Singapore’s managed floating arrangement. This paper also considers what may be a
desirable currency system for the region. Given the high volatility of yen/dollar
exchange rates and partner diversity of trade and foreign direct investment (FDI)
relationships, it claims that the emerging East Asian economies would be better off
stabilizing their currencies to a balanced currency basket in which the dollar, the
yen, and the euro play equally important roles. For intra-regional exchange rate 
stability, greater coordination on the currency basket policy would be desirable, and
this needs to be supported by regional policy dialogue and financing mechanisms.
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Reflecting on the East Asian currency crisis in 1997–98, this paper examines how the
East Asian exchange rate arrangements have evolved over the last decade. For this
purpose, it examines exchange rate arrangements of other developing countries 
and evaluates the East Asian practice from an international comparative perspective.
It also explores what may be a resilient regional exchange rate arrangement for East
Asia’s financial stability, economic development, and sustained growth. 
The East Asian currency crisis forced many economies in the region to shift away
from de facto dollar-pegged regimes to more flexible exchange rate regimes. The 
dollar had played a dominant role as an international anchor currency until the 
outbreak of the crisis in the summer of 1997. During the crisis, the anchor currency
role of the dollar was substantially reduced, due to a general shift to more flexible rate
arrangements. As the currency crisis subsided in the second half of 1998, however,
the East Asian economies generally restored exchange rate stability—with the 
exception of Indonesia. This restoration of rate stability was accompanied by a
greater role of the dollar in some countries—notably in Malaysia—and a greater role
of the yen in others—notably in Singapore, Korea, and Thailand.
Emerging market economies, including those in East Asia,
1 face a trade-off
between the virtue of exchange rate stability to promote trade, investment, and
growth and the need for flexibility, particularly during a time of crisis, to maintain
international price-competitiveness and facilitate adjustment. The “two-corner 
solution” approach of choosing either a pure float—often accompanied by inflation
targeting—or a hard peg—an institutionally binding fixed rate regime like monetary
union, unilateral “dollarization” or “yenization,” or a currency board—does not
appear to be realistic in many emerging East Asian economies. The reason is that
they appear to have a “fear of floating” or a preference toward exchange rate stability,
though not necessarily rigidity. Given emerging East Asia’s diversified trade and 
FDI relationships with the United States, Japan, and the European Union (EU) and
given the continued high exchange rate volatility among the tripolar currencies, a 
reasonable exchange rate policy for the region would be to stabilize rates to a basket
of currencies consisting of the dollar, the yen, and the euro. 
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section II examines the nature of
“official” and “observed” exchange rate arrangements for developing economies in the
world. This section finds that many authorities in the developing world exhibit a
“fear of floating” or a preference for stable exchange rates vis-à-vis an international
currency or a basket of such currencies. Section III analyzes the changing importance
of the dollar, the yen, and the euro as international anchor currencies for the
exchange rate behavior of the emerging East Asian economies before, during, and
after the currency crisis. It finds that the dollar played a dominant role as an anchor
currency for exchange rate stabilization in emerging East Asia in the pre-crisis period,
but that its dominant role naturally declined during the crisis. It also finds that, 
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1. In this paper, emerging East Asian economies include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.in the post-crisis period, some economies have reverted to a pre-crisis type of 
dollar-based exchange rate regime, while others have allowed greater exchange rate
flexibility. Several countries have shifted to a de facto currency basket arrangement
with larger weights on the yen. Section IV proposes a region-wide currency basket
system where the dollar, the yen, and the euro would play more balanced roles. How
tightly or loosely the exchange rate should be stabilized is left to each economy’s 
specific conditions and preferences, at least initially. It also argues that a currency 
basket system needs to be accompanied by closer regional coordination through
financing and policy dialogue mechanisms, in a manner commensurate with real 
sector integration. Section V summarizes the paper.
II. Trends in Exchange Rate Arrangements in the 
Developing World
A. “Official” Exchange Rate Arrangements
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) regularly publishes exchange rate arrange-
ments formally reported by its member countries according to its own classification
scheme. In 1999, the IMF started to pay greater attention to the de facto exchange
rate arrangement practices of its members rather than using only formally reported
arrangements. Table 1 summarizes such “official” arrangements for developing 
countries during 1980–2001.
2 In this table, exchange rate arrangements are classified
broadly into three categories; a fixed exchange rate arrangement, limited exchange
rate flexibility, and a more flexible exchange rate arrangement.
3
While the number of IMF members in the developing world has increased 
over time (from 118 in 1980 to 163 in 2001), the number of countries under 
fixed exchange rate arrangements has decreased (from 90 to 76), and the number of 
countries under more flexible exchange rate arrangements has increased (from about
25 to 83). As far as “official” exchange rate arrangements are concerned, many 
countries have shifted from fixed to more flexible arrangements over the last 20 years.
Nonetheless, quite a few countries still attempt to stabilize their exchange rates.
Indeed, 80 countries (49 percent of the total) were on “fixed exchange rate arrange-
ments” and “limited exchange rate flexibility” in 2001. In addition, some countries
under “more flexible arrangements” are known to have stabilized their exchange rates
vis-à-vis a certain currency or a basket of currencies.
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2. See International Monetary Fund (1997), and Mussa et al. (2000) for discussions of exchange rate arrangements
in developing countries. Table 1 is compiled from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics (various issues) by
removing industrialized countries.
3. Beginning in January 1999, the IMF introduced a new classification of categories that includes (1) exchange 
arrangements with no separate legal tender; (2) currency board arrangements; (3) other conventional fixed-peg
arrangements (including de facto peg arrangements under managed floating); (4) pegged exchange rates within
horizontal bands; (5) crawling pegs; (6) exchange rates within crawling bands; (7) managed floating with no 
preannounced path for exchange rate; and (8) independently floating. As the new classification is not strictly 
comparable to earlier classifications, I have decided to compile Table 1 according to the earlier classification,
assuming that (1), (2), and (3) belong to a “fixed rate arrangement,” (4) is “limited exchange rate flexibility,” (5),
(6), and (7) belong to “managed floating,” and (8) is “independently floating.” The last two combined represent a































































Table 1  Summary of Official Exchange Rate Arrangements of IMF-Member Developing Countries, 1980–2001
Number of countries
Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Dec. Sept. Jan. Dec. Dec. Dec.
1980 85 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 99 2000 01
Fixed exchange rate arrangement 90 89 81 75 82 71 70 65 65 65 63 73 79 79 76
P e g g e d  t o  t h e  d o l l a r 3 93 12 52 42 42 12 32 22 12 02 03 13 83 73 8
Pegged to the euro 15 14 15 15 15 16 16 17 17 19 20 21 21 22 21
Pegged to the French franc 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 15 15 15 15 15 —
Pegged to the deutschemark 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4 5 —
Pegged to other EMU currency 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 —
Pegged to the U.K. pound sterling 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
P e g g e d  t o  t h e  R u s s i a n  r u b l e 000061100000000
P e g g e d  t o  o t h e r  c u r r e n c y 245355656777777
P e g g e d  t o  S D R 1 5 1 16654432342221
Pegged to other currency composite 18 28 30 27 27 24 20 18 19 16 12 12 11 11 9
Limited exchange rate flexibility a 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 9 3 4 4
More flexible exchange rate arrangement 3+b+c 32 46 54 58 77 81 88 89 89 92 80 80 80 83
Adjusted according to a set of indicators 3 4 5 5 3 4 3 2 2 — — — — — —
O t h e r  m a n a g e d  f l o a t i n g b1 72 12 52 22 83 04 24 34 45 54 13 74 25 2
Independently floating c 11 20 24 33 45 48 44 44 45 37 39 43 38 31
Unclassified 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 118 127 132 134 144 152 155 157 158 158 159 162 162 163 163
Notes: 1. Though a new classification of exchange rate arrangements was introduced on January 1, 1999, the table summarizes official exchange rate arrangements on the basis of earlier classifica-
tion methods. To try to maintain consistency with the earlier classification, several assumptions are made: a “fixed exchange rate arrangement” includes “exchange arrangements with 
no separate legal tender,” “currency board arrangements,” and “other conventional fixed-peg arrangements (including de facto peg arrangements under managed floating)”; “limited
exchange rate flexibility” corresponds to “pegged exchange rates within horizontal bands”; “managed floating” includes “crawling pegs,” “exchange rates within crawling bands,” 
and “managed floating with no preannounced path for exchange rate”; and “independently floating” in the table corresponds to “independently floating” under the new classification.
Notes: 2. The number of countries under “fixed exchange rate arrangement” jumped upward in January 1999 because nine countries began to be reclassified as “other conventional fixed-peg
arrangements (including de facto peg arrangements under managed floating)” rather than as managed or independently floating, and three economies (Aruba, Hong Kong, and Netherlands
Antilles) were added to the list. 
Notes: 3. Given that the euro was introduced in January 1999, the row for “pegged to the euro” is created to indicate the number of developing countries that had pegged their currencies to EMU-12 
currencies—mainly the French franc, the deutschemark, the Spanish peseta, and the Portuguese escudo—until the end of 1998.
Notes: 4. Several IMF-member and non-member developing economies are not always included in this table, e.g., Hong Kong (1980–98), Taiwan, and Cambodia (1980 and 1992).
Notes: 5. The sum of a, b, and c in the table in 1980 is 25.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (various issues).Focusing on the fixed rate arrangements in the developing world, as of December
2001, the dollar is the most popular target currency (for 42 developing countries
including four countries under “flexibility limited in terms of a single currency”), 
followed by the euro (formerly the French franc for 15 countries, the deutschemark
for four countries and the Portuguese escudo and the Italian lira for one country each
after January 1999), non-special drawing right (SDR) currency baskets (for nine
countries), and the SDR (for one country).
4 It is noteworthy to observe that no
developing country pegs its exchange rate any longer to the U.K. pound sterling, 
particularly since 1986, or to the yen throughout the period.
B. “Observed” Exchange Rate Arrangements: Quantitative Analyses 
The “official” exchange rate arrangements provide information about the nature 
of the arrangements as reported by individual countries and, where appropriate,
reclassified by the IMF when formally reported arrangements differ from the actual
practices. However, these official arrangements still do not accurately describe the
actual practice of exchange rate policies, nor do they offer sufficient information as to
which currency or basket of currencies is chosen as a target for de facto exchange rate
stabilization. To understand which exchange rate arrangements are actually in place,
one must statistically examine the observed behavior of relevant variables, particularly
exchange rates.
5
One way to do this is through a regression analysis technique used by Frankel and
Wei (1993, 1994, 1995) and to identify which major currency or currency basket 
is chosen as an anchor for a particular country’s exchange rate stabilization and 
how closely such a relationship can be observed. In this subsection, we estimate the 




t = α + β 1∆ e
USD
t + β 2∆ e
DM
t + β 3∆ e
JY
t + β 4∆ e
FF





t is the monthly change in the log exchange rate of currency j in month t, 
α is a constant term, β k (k = 1, 2, . . .) is the coefficient on the monthly change in the
log exchange rate of currency k, and ut is the residual term. The superscripts USD,
DM, JY, FF, and UKP refer to the dollar, the deutschemark, the yen, the French
franc, and the U.K. pound sterling, respectively. The estimated standard error of
regression residuals can be interpreted as a measure of exchange rate volatility. A
monthly change in the exchange rate is defined by the first difference of the natural
logarithm of the nominal exchange rate. For some countries, we use as right-hand
side variables the exchange rates of the SDR, European Currency Unit (ECU), and
other relevant minor, regional currencies, reflecting country-specific characteristics.
Following Frankel and Wei (1994), we express all the exchange rates in terms of a
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4. Other target currencies for single-currency pegs include the South African rand (for three countries in December
2001), the Indian rupee (for two countries), the Australian dollar, and the Singapore dollar (for one country each).
In the past, the U.K. pound sterling, the Spanish peseta, and the Russian ruble were also targets for single-currency pegs.
5. A more detailed study would require analysis of changes in foreign exchange reserves, foreign exchange market
pressure, and interest rates.
6. This exercise is an extension of the studies conducted by the author for an earlier sample period (see Kawai and
Akiyama [1998]).numeraire currency, the Swiss franc.
7 In this exercise, we have decided to remove data
observations with values of log first differences greater than 0.1 to minimize the
impacts of discrete devaluations or revaluations.
8
This exercise provides useful information on “observed” exchange rate arrangements
for developing countries. The underlying hypothesis is that every country attempts 
to stabilize the exchange rate to a basket of multiple currencies. First, it can identify 
specific currencies that comprise a basket in each developing country’s exchange rate
stabilization policy in terms of the estimated coefficients in the regression equation.
Exchange rate stabilization to a single currency can be interpreted as a special case in
which only one currency is identified with a significant and large positive coefficient,
while other currencies’ coefficients are small and statistically insignificant. Second, it
can identify the degree to which the authorities allow or limit exchange rate flexibility
depending on the size of exchange rate volatility as measured by the estimated standard
error of regression. A large size of the estimated standard error of regression implies that
the authorities allow relatively large exchange rate flexibility, while a small size indicates
that they attempt to stabilize their exchange rates. 
Based on the regression analysis, developing economies can be classified into three
broad categories according to their “observed” exchange rate arrangements, that is,
pegged, intermediate, and flexible, depending on the size of exchange rate volatility.
Specifically, countries are classified to be under the “pegged” arrangement when
volatility is less than 0.0075, “intermediate” when volatility is between 0.0075 
and 0.015, and “flexible” when volatility exceeds 0.015.
9 Table 2 summarizes this
information for the period 1980–99 by dividing the whole sample into five-year 
sub-samples.
10 Table 3 summarizes observed exchange rate arrangements of emerging
market economies over the same sample periods.
11
Table 2 reveals several interesting points. First, the number of developing 
countries under the “pegged” rate arrangement has declined as a trend, though there
was some reversal in this trend in the second half of the 1990s. On the other hand, the
number of countries under the “flexible” rate arrangement has risen as a trend. The
number of countries under the “intermediate” rate arrangement has risen slightly. In
the second half of the 1990s where 157 developing country currencies are examined,
75 countries (48 percent of the total) are under the “pegged” arrangement, 29 countries
(18 percent) under the “intermediate” arrangement, and 53 countries (34 percent)
under the “flexible” arrangement. Second, regardless of the extent of exchange rate 
flexibility, almost all developing countries appear to have their own preferred anchor in
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7. In other papers, Frankel and Wei (1993, 1995) use the SDR as a numeraire currency, but we do not follow this
procedure because our study regards the SDR as a potential candidate for a nominal anchor. 
8. We have done so because countries often change their parities or central rates to accommodate persistent differences
in inflation rates or productivities vis-à-vis their nominal anchor-currency country. Without eliminating the 
effects of such discrete devaluations or revaluations, it would be difficult to conclude the presence or absence of 
a nominal anchor currency for certain countries.
9. The value 0.0100 is approximately a 1 percent change in monthly exchange rates.
10. Table 2 in the working paper version of this paper also provides the size of exchange rate volatility, the number of
excluded observations due to large, discrete exchange rate changes, and other information. The working paper is
downloadable from http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/edps/2002/02-E-17.pdf.  
11. Emerging market economies include those in East Asia (see Footnote 1) as well as Argentina, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Peru, Poland, the Russian Federation, South
Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela.terms of a single currency or a basket of currencies. The dollar is the most preferred
anchor currency (for 84 countries or 54 percent of all developing countries in the 
second half of the 1990s), followed by a basket of currencies (for 41 countries or 
26 percent) and other single currencies (for 31 countries or 20 percent). There 
were very few countries where anchor currencies could not be identified. Third, as 
can be seen in Table 3, until the mid-1990s, a majority of non-East Asian emerging
173
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Table 2  Summary of Observed Exchange Rate Arrangements of Developing
Countries (Classified by Monthly Data)
Number of countries; number of emerging market economies in parentheses
Sample 
Dollar
Other single  Basket of
Total period currency currencies
[1] Pegged: Jan. 1980–
39 (3) 23 (0) 21 (4) 83   (7) 0 ≤ volatility < 0.0075 Dec. 1984
Jan. 1985–
32 (1) 22 (0) 15 (3) 69   (4) Dec. 1989
Jan. 1990–
31 (2) 22 (0) 14 (4) 67   (6) Dec. 1994
Jan. 1995–
37 (3) 24 (0) 14 (0) 75   (3) Dec. 1999
[2] Intermediate: Jan. 1980–
10 (3) 0 (0) 15 (4) 25   (7) 0.0075 ≤ volatility < 0.015 Dec. 1984
Jan. 1985–
14 (7) 1 (0) 14 (2) 29   (9) Dec. 1989
Jan. 1990–
10 (5) 1 (0) 23 (7) 34 (12) Dec. 1994
Jan. 1995–
16 (4) 1 (1) 12 (3) 29   (8) Dec. 1999
[3] Flexible: Jan. 1980–
12 (7) 1 (0) 10 (2) 24   (9) volatility ≥ 0.015 Dec. 1984
Jan. 1985–
24 (6) 2 (0) 10 (4) 36 (10) Dec. 1989
Jan. 1990–
29 (5) 7 (1) 17 (1) 53   (7)
Dec. 1994
Jan. 1995–
31 (6) 6 (3) 15 (5) 53 (14)
Dec. 1999
Notes: 1. Countries are classified into three categories of exchange rate arrangements (pegged, 
intermediate, and flexible), depending on the size of exchange rate volatility as measured 
by the standard error of regression. Countries are classified as “pegged” when the volatility 
is less than 0.0075, “intermediate” when the volatility is between 0.0075 and 0.015, and 
“flexible” when the volatility is equal to or greater than 0.015. In each category, countries are
further classified into three groups, depending on what currency or basket of currencies is
assigned a significant weight in the regression equation. The “dollar” group includes those
for which the dollar appears as the only significant currency in the regression equation. The
“other single currency” group includes those for which another single currency appears as
the only significant currency in the regression equation. The “basket of currencies” group
includes those for which multiple currencies appear as significant in the regression equation. 
Notes: 2. Emerging market economies include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, the Czech
Republic, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Korea (Republic of), Malaysia,
Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, Singapore, South
Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela.
Notes: 3. There is one country each for the periods January 1980–December 1984 (Lebanon) and
January 1995–December 1999 (Congo, Democratic Rep.), whose volatility exceeds 0.03
without any identified currency weight.economies were under the “flexible” or “intermediate” arrangements, while most 
of the East Asian emerging economies were under the “pegged” or “intermediate”
arrangements. That is, emerging economies in East Asia showed stronger preferences
for exchange rate stability—or a stronger “fear of floating”—than those in non-East
Asia. However, crisis-affected countries and Singapore shifted to the “flexible” 
arrangement due to the outbreak of currency crisis in the second half of the 1990s.
12
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Table 3  Emerging Market Economies under Alternative, Observed Exchange Rate
Arrangements (Classified by Monthly Data)
Sample 
Dollar
Other single  Basket of 
period currency currencies
[1] Pegged Jan. 1980– Venezuela, Colombia,  Indonesia, Singapore,
Dec. 1984 Taiwan India, Malaysia





Hong Kong, Korea Thailand, Indonesia,
Singapore
Jan. 1995– Argentina, 
Dec. 1999 Hong Kong, China
[2] Intermediate Jan. 1980– Korea, Mexico, Thailand, Pakistan,
Dec. 1984 Philippines China, Israel
Colombia, China,
Jan. 1985– Korea, Singapore, India, Malaysia
Dec. 1989 Philippines, Taiwan,
Venezuela
India, Colombia,  Taiwan, Pakistan, 
Jan. 1990– Mexico, Chile,  South Africa, 
Dec. 1994 China Malaysia, Israel,  
Hungary, Argentina
Jan. 1995– Venezuela, Peru,  Czech Republic Hungary, Taiwan, 
Dec. 1999 Brazil, Turkey India
[3] Flexible Hungary, Hong Kong,
Jan. 1980–
Brazil, Peru, Chile,  Turkey, South Africa
Dec. 1984
Poland, Argentina
Jan. 1985– Turkey, Hungary, 
Chile, Peru, Argentina,




Poland, Philippines,  
Dec. 1994




Jan. 1995– South Africa,  Thailand, Malaysia, 
Poland, Korea, 
Dec. 1999 Russian Federation, Indonesia
Philippines
Mexico, Colombia
Notes: 1. Emerging East Asian economies include China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. They are shown in italics.
Notes: 2. Non-East Asian emerging market economies include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, India, Israel, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Poland, the Russian
Federation, South Africa, Turkey, and Venezuela.
12. Table 3 reports that while Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia adopted a “flexible” rate arrangement in the second
half of the 1990s, they used a non-U.S. dollar currency as a target for exchange rate stabilization. This currencyWhile an increasing number of developing countries shifted away from fixed
toward more flexible exchange rate arrangements on an “official” basis by the 1990s,
almost all countries attempted to stabilize their exchange rates against a single currency
or a currency basket, though the degree of rate stabilization varied considerably across
countries. Many countries regard the dollar as their anchor currency despite the
absence of a formal commitment to a dollar peg. Notable is the fact that quite a few
economies are using currency baskets as their anchor without officially announcing it.
C. Formation of Tripolar Currency Areas
Using the results in the preceding subsection, we can estimate the size of tripolar 
currency areas, that is, currency areas formed by the dollar, the new European single 
currency (euro), and the yen. The objective here is to gain insight into the current state
and evolution of the international monetary system by quantitatively gauging the size of
major currency areas. Particularly interesting is to evaluate the impact of the creation of
the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and introduction of the euro on
the international monetary system. The main question is whether the newly introduced
euro is strong enough to seriously challenge the dollar’s dominance and to convert the
dollar-dominated international monetary system into a regime centered on both the 
dollar and the euro. Another important question is what role the yen can play.
13
1. Defining currency areas
In this subsection, we calculate the economic size of a currency area in terms of GDP
and trade flows (exports plus imports), expressed as current dollar values, using data for
the period 1990–99. By using different economic variables as the basis for measuring
the size of currency areas, we can further our understanding of the importance of the
major currencies as nominal anchors for the rest of the world. 
In this calculation, we undertake the following four steps: first, we start by focus-
ing on the currencies of the G-5 countries (i.e., the United States, Germany, France,
the United Kingdom, and Japan) in addition to the SDR and the ECU. Each of these
G-5 currencies is assumed to form a currency area of its own. If any country rigidly pegs
its exchange rate to a particular G-5 currency, its entire economy, measured by GDP 
or trade flows, is classified as belonging to the currency area formed by this particular
currency. If a country stabilizes its exchange rate to a basket of multiple currencies, its
economy is divided into fractions of major currency areas according to the weights
assigned to these major currencies in a basket. The coefficients that were estimated 
in the previous section as statistically significant, at least at the 5 percent level, are 
interpreted as the weights assigned to the corresponding currencies. If a country 
does not stabilize its exchange rate against any single currency or currency basket, its
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turns out to be the Singapore dollar despite the fact that these countries did not pursue conscious policies to use
the Singapore dollar as their official target. Since Singapore was under a currency basket system during this
period, these three countries are considered to have been under a similar currency basket arrangement. At any
rate, this result appears to reflect statistical relationships observed on the average during the sample period that
includes the currency crisis episode.
13. See Alogoskoufis and Portes (1997) and Bergsten (1997), who argue that the introduction of the euro will 
challenge the dollar’s dominance and convert the international monetary system into a bipolar system centered 
on both the dollar and the euro. They do not see much potential for the yen to grow into another dominant
international currency.economy is considered not to belong to any currency area; it adopts flexible exchange
rates vis-à-vis the major currencies. In essence, we divide each individual country into
different fractions of currency areas and then calculate the size of a currency area for the
world as a whole by summing the corresponding fractions over all countries.
14
Second, the weights assigned to anchor currencies are obtained from the 
estimated coefficients of a regression equation that are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5 percent level or above. If the sum of the estimated coefficients is
equal to or less than one, their values are used as weights. If the sum exceeds unity, all
the coefficients are proportionally rescaled downward to make the sum equal to one
and the rescaled coefficients are used as weights.
Third, using procedures similar to the first step, we also calculate the size of the 
currency area formed by the currency of a minor, regional country—such as Australia,
India, New Zealand, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, and Spain. We next distribute
the currency area formed by such a minor, regional currency to the larger currency
areas formed by the G-5 currencies, the SDR, and the ECU, by using the estimated
regression coefficients for each minor, regional currency. We also distribute the 
currency areas formed by the SDR and the ECU to G-5 currency areas, by using the
estimated regression coefficients for these composite currencies. In this way, a country
that stabilizes its currency to a minor, regional currency, the SDR, or the ECU can be
divided into fractions of G-5 currency areas. 
2. Currency areas formed by the euro, the dollar, and the yen
Finally, we calculate the global size of the euro area, by adding the size of EMU mem-
bers and the currency areas formed by the French franc (FF) and the deutschemark
(DM)—and by the U.K. pound sterling depending on the definition of the euro area—
for non-EMU countries.
15 A sample of 99 countries is used for such calculations. 
We consider two cases with regard to the scope of the euro area, depending on which
countries form the EMU: the current case of the EU-12 (Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and
Spain) forming the EMU, and the prospective case of the EU-15 (the EU-12 plus
Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom) forming a Greater EMU. The latter case
defines the maximum possible size of the EMU in the conceivable future, because it
also assumes that the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic
states also stabilize their currencies to the euro.
16 If EMU membership is expanded to
include all EU countries, the size of the euro area will be correspondingly larger while
the size of the dollar area will probably become smaller. The size of the yen area will
probably not be affected much by the scale of EMU membership.
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14. We use annual data for the period from 1990 through 1999. Most data series are taken from the IMF’s
International Financial Statistics and, if necessary, are supplemented by national sources. Data for GDP and
trade flows are converted into dollars at the annual average exchange rate. We have selected only those countries
where data series for GDP and trade flows are available. Transition countries in Central and Eastern Europe and
in the former Soviet bloc are under-represented in our sample due to the lack of data over the entire sample
period. Many African countries are also absent in the sample. In terms of economic size, however, our sample of
99 countries covers a substantial amount of global economic activity and trade flows.
15. For this purpose, similar regressions have also been run for non-EMU developed countries. These countries have
been divided into fractions of G-5 currency areas.
16. Honohan and Lane (1999) claim that the Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Union countries




















































































[1] Measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Current Dollars 
Percent; US$ billions in parentheses
Case of EMU Case of Greater EMU
Dollar Yen Euro U.K. pound Other Dollar Yen Euro U.K. pound Other
Regional total
area area area area area area area area
Industrial countries 29.8 15.8 26.4 4.9 0.1 29.6 15.8 31.5 0.0 0.0 76.9 (20,182)
European Union-15 0.2 0.0 24.8 4.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 29.5 0.0 0.0 29.5 (7,727)
EU-12 0.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 23.7 0.0 0.0 23.7 (6,214)
Three other EU 
0.2 0.0 1.1 4.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 5.8 (1,513) members
United States 26.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 26.5 (6,962)
Japan 0.0 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.7 (4,117)
Other 3.0 0.1 1.6 0.4 0.0 3.0 0.1 2.1 0.0 0.0 5.2 (1,377)
Developing countries 18.2 0.9 2.3 0.5 1.2 15.6 0.8 5.4 0.0 1.2 23.1 (6,050)
Africa 0.9 0.0 0.4 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.1 1.5 (405)
Asia 7.3 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.3 7.3 0.8 1.1 0.0 0.3 9.5 (2,492)
Europe 2.8 0.0 0.7 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 3.4 0.0 0.4 4.0 (1,059)
Middle East 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 1.6 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.9 (491)
Western hemisphere 5.5 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 5.5 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 6.1 (1,603)
World total
47.9 16.7 28.7 5.4 1.3 45.2 16.7 36.9 0.0 1.2 100.0 (26,233)
(12,570) (4,376) (7,523) (1,413) (351) (11,859) (4,374) (9,691) (0) (309) (26,233)
Notes: 1. The EU-12 includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Notes: 2. Three other EU members are Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Notes: 3. Greater EMU includes all 15 EU member countries and assumes that Central and European countries in transition (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Romania)
and the Baltic states stabilize exchange rates to the euro.
(Continued on next page)































































Table 4  (continued)
[2] Measured by Total Trade Flows (Exports Plus Imports) in Current Dollars
Percent; US$ billions in parentheses
Case of EMU Case of Greater EMU
Dollar Yen Euro U.K. pound
Other
Dollar Yen Euro U.K. pound
Other
Regional total
area area area area area area area area
Industrial countries 18.5 7.3 35.9 6.1 0.1 18.3 7.3 42.4 0.0 0.5 68.0 (6,267)
European Union-15 0.3 0.0 33.6 4.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 39.4 0.0 0.0 39.4 (3,634)
EU-12 0.0 0.0 31.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 31.9 0.0 0.0 31.9 (2,939)
Three other EU 
0.3 0.0 1.7 4.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 7.5 0.0 0.0 7.5 (695) members
United States 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 14.0 (1,289)
Japan 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.2 (662)
Other 4.3 0.1 2.3 0.7 0.0 4.3 0.1 3.0 0.0 0.0 7.4 (681)
Developing countries 24.2 1.8 3.9 0.8 1.3 21.6 1.7 7.5 0.0 1.2 32.0 (2,950)
Africa 1.1 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.2 1.1 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.2 2.0 (185)
Asia 12.9 1.6 1.7 0.4 0.4 12.9 1.6 2.1 0.0 0.4 17.0 (1,569)
Europe 2.9 0.0 1.5 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.3 4.9 (454)
Middle East 2.8 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 2.8 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.2 3.3 (302)
Western hemisphere 4.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 4.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 4.8 (440)
World total
42.8 9.1 39.8 6.9 1.5 39.9 9.1 49.9 0.0 1.2 100.0 (9,216)
(3,942) (835) (3,670) (634) (135) (3,674) (835) (4,596) (0) (112) (9,216)
Notes: 1. The EU-12 includes Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain.
Notes: 2. Three other EU members are Denmark, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
Notes: 3. Greater EMU includes all 15 EU member countries and assumes that Central and European countries in transition (e.g., Hungary, Poland, and Romania)
and the Baltic states stabilize exchange rates to the euro.179
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Table 4 summarizes the results of these calculations. The table reports the relative
economic shares for each of the three major currency areas, based on GDP and total
trade flows, for developing as well as developed countries. It shows that choice of 
measurement—GDP or trade flows—influences the size of the dollar and euro areas.
Taking the case of Greater EMU, the GDP measure indicates that the dollar area is still
larger than the euro area. For example, 45 percent of the world economy is covered 
by the dollar area, 37 percent by the euro area, and 17 percent by the yen area. The 
dollar area is large because many developing countries, particularly those in Asia and
Latin America, regard the dollar as the most important nominal anchor. The size of the 
dollar area outside the United States is about 19 percent of the world’s GDP, of which
the developing world accounts for 16 percent. In contrast, the size of the euro area 
outside the EU-15 members is 7.5 percent of the world’s GDP, of which the develop-
ing world accounts for 5 percent. The yen area’s share (17 percent) is only slightly 
bigger than the weight of the Japanese economy in the world (16 percent).
17 The yen
area outside Japan is small and accounts for only 1 percent of the world’s GDP, which 
underlines the fact that the yen is not a full-fledged, global nominal anchor currency.
The trade flow measure indicates that the euro area will be larger than the dollar
area. The euro area accounts for 50 percent of the world total trade flows, the dollar
area 40 percent and the yen area a meager 9 percent. Interpretation of trade-based
economic size requires caution because the underlying trade flows do not net out
intra-EU trade flows, and the predominance of the euro area measured by trade activ-
ity may be exaggerated. Essentially, the relative economic size of the euro area
depends on which economic activity is considered more important to the world as a
whole, real economic activity or trade activity.
D. Preference for Exchange Rate Stability in Emerging Market Economies
The results described above reveal that the “observed” exchange rate arrangements are
largely consistent with the “official” exchange rate policies, with some exceptions.
The results also provide several stylized facts and general conclusions about the 
individual developing economies’ exchange rate arrangements.
First, many developing countries—including emerging market economies—have
shifted their “official” exchange rate arrangements from “fixed” to “more flexible” 
rate regimes. However, they often exhibit preferences toward stable exchange rates
vis-à-vis a single currency or a currency basket. Countries facing large exchange rate
fluctuations against major international currencies were those in the early stage of
economic transition in Eastern Europe or the former Soviet Union or economies 
subject to chronically high inflation.
Second, non-East Asian emerging market economies tend to have a “flexible” or
“intermediate” arrangement, while the East Asian emerging economies tend to
choose a “pegged” or “intermediate” arrangement. The East Asian economies appear
to exhibit greater preference for exchange rate stability or a greater fear of floating
than their non-East Asian counterparts.
17. These relative share numbers correspond to the figures estimated by other authors such as Bergsten (1997) and
Masson and Turtleboom (1997).Third, the dollar is the most favored anchor currency for exchange rate stabilization
in the developing world. However, significant diversity exists across regions globally 
in exchange rate arrangements. For African countries, their major exchange rate 
stabilization anchors are the euro (formerly the French franc), the dollar, and the 
SDR. Asian economies generally attempt to stabilize their exchange rates vis-à-vis 
the dollar, the SDR, and a few regional currencies. The yen has not played a major
anchor currency role even in East Asia. The transition economies in Central and
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union have not experienced stable exchange
rates or stable arrangements in general, but many of them are expected to eventually
stabilize their currencies to the euro. The Middle East includes countries that have 
successfully stabilized exchange rates vis-à-vis the dollar and/or the SDR. The whole 
of Latin America is a de facto dollar area, and even countries not officially pegging
exchange rates to the dollar do assign significantly positive, and close to unitary,
weights to the dollar.
Fourth, a developing country’s choice of anchor currency for exchange rate 
stabilization depends largely on which currency areas the country tends to trade 
with, as well as on the country’s geographical location and its past colonial ties.
18
For example, a country that trades heavily with the dollar area tends to choose the
dollar as an exchange rate stabilization anchor. By implication, a country that trades
with several currency areas with more or less equal shares is expected to choose a 
well-balanced currency basket as its anchor for exchange rate stabilization.
III. The East Asian Exchange Rate Arrangements
In this section, we attempt to identify the exchange rate arrangements that have 
prevailed in East Asia, particularly in former crisis countries and the neighboring
emerging economies, before and after the 1997–98 currency crisis. An important task
is to identify factors behind the choice of exchange rate arrangements in the pre-crisis
as well as post-crisis periods. 
A. Changes in the Official Exchange Rate Arrangements in East Asia
To identify the exchange rate arrangements in emerging East Asia in the pre-crisis
and post-crisis periods, it is useful first to take a look at the official exchange rate
arrangements as published by the IMF. Table 5 summarizes changes in exchange rate
arrangements in not only the former crisis countries—Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
the Philippines, and Thailand—but also Japan, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and
other ASEAN countries.
Table 5 indicates several facts. First, emerging East Asia has exhibited a variety 
of exchange rate arrangements, ranging from a currency board system (Hong Kong)
to independently floating (Philippines). In between these two polar cases, there are
conventional fixed pegs to a single currency (China and post-crisis Malaysia) or a 
currency basket (Singapore and pre-crisis Thailand) as well as managed floating 
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18. See Kawai and Akiyama (2000) for such empirical evidence.181
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Table 5  Official Exchange Rate Arrangements in the East Asian Economies
Article VIII Pre-crisis and mid-crisis  Post-crisis exchange rate  Country (date accepted) exchange rate arrangements  arrangement (Dec. 2001) (dates of change)
Japan Apr. 1, 1964 Independently floating  Independently floating
(July 1982–present)
Managed floating (June 1982–
Korea Nov. 1, 1988 Nov. 1997); independently  Independently floating
floating (Nov. 1997–present)
Managed floating (Oct. 1986–Sep.  Conventional fixed peg to the 
China Dec. 1, 1996 1998); conventional fixed peg to  dollar 
the dollar (Jan. 1999–present)
Currency board arrangement with  Currency board arrangement with 




Managed floating (Apr. 1989–present)
Managed floating (Dec. 1983– Managed floating with no 
Indonesia May 7, 1988 July 1997); independently floating  preannounced path for exchange 
(Aug. 1997–Sep. 2001) rate (Sep. 2001–present)
Peg to other currency composite 
(Sep. 1975–June 1993);  Conventional fixed peg to the 
Malaysia Nov. 11, 1968 managed floating (June 1993– dollar
Sep. 1998); peg to the dollar 
(Sep. 1998–present)
Philippines Sep. 8, 1995 Independently floating  Independently floating
(Nov. 1984–present)
Managed floating  Managed floating with no 
Singapore Nov. 9, 1968 (Dec. 1987–present) preannounced path for exchange 
rate
Peg to other currency composite  Managed floating with no 
Thailand May 4, 1990 (Nov. 1984–June 1997);  preannounced path for exchange 
independently floating  rate (Sep. 2001–present)
(July 1997–Sep. 2001)
Currency board arrangement with  Currency board arrangement  Brunei Oct. 10, 1995 a peg to the Singapore dollar  with a peg to the Singapore dollar Darussalam (Mar. 1996–present)
Managed floating 
Managed floating with no 
Cambodia Jan. 1, 2002
(June 1993–present)
preannounced path for exchange 
rate
Managed floating (Mar. 1989– Managed floating with no 
Laos Article XIV
Sep. 1995); independently floating  preannounced path for exchange 
(Sep. 1995–June 1997); managed  rate
floating (June 1997–present)
Peg to the SDR 
Managed floating with no 
Myanmar Article XIV
(Feb. 1975–Dec. 2001)
preannounced path for exchange 
rate (Dec. 2001–present)
Pegged exchange rate within 
Peg to the dollar (Mar. 1989– horizontal bands (Jan. 1999–
Vietnam Article XIV Mar. 1990); managed floating  Dec. 2001); managed floating 
(Mar. 1993–Sep. 1998) with no preannounced path for 
exchange rate (Dec. 2001–
present)
Note: Information on Taiwan is based on Fischer (2001).
Sources: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics (various issues); Annual
Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2001.(pre-crisis Korea, Indonesia, and Singapore).
19 Second, three (Korea, Indonesia, and
Thailand) out of the five former crisis countries saw a change in their official
exchange rate arrangements in the direction of greater exchange rate flexibility, while
Malaysia moved in the opposite direction. Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and the
Philippines have maintained identical exchange rate arrangements in the pre- and
post-crisis periods.
However, “official” exchange rate arrangements may not describe the accurate
state and evolution of the exchange rate policies in emerging East Asia, particularly
those in the former crisis countries. First, countries under managed floating (Korea,
Indonesia, and Malaysia) or independently floating (the Philippines) in the pre-crisis
period may have had a regime more akin to pegged arrangements, because otherwise
they would not have been subjected to currency speculation. Second, one may 
wonder whether economies, particularly former crisis countries that adopted inde-
pendent floating in the post-crisis period, have really been floating their exchange
rates. The “fear of floating” argument hypothesizes that despite the officially declared
arrangement, the actual practice of exchange rate management is close to managed or
pegged arrangements. Indeed McKinnon (2001) and others claim that the former
crisis countries have reverted to pre-crisis, dollar-based exchange rate arrangements.
It is thus important to examine the actual behavior of the exchange rates for
emerging economies in East Asia, particularly for former crisis countries, and 
empirically identify their pre-crisis arrangements and changes in such arrangements
in the post-crisis period by looking at the data in a more detailed way.
B. The Changing Roles of the Dollar, the Yen, and the Euro in East Asia
The hypothesis here is that the roles of the dollar, the yen, and the euro (or its 
predecessor) as anchors for exchange rate stabilization have changed since the 
outbreak of the East Asian currency crisis. A Frankel-Wei type of regression of daily
movements in each economy’s exchange rate on the movements of the three major
international currencies facilitates a convenient comparison of the roles of the tripolar
currencies across major emerging East Asian economies as well as over time.
Similarly to the previous case, the daily—rather than monthly—change in the log
exchange rate of each East Asian currency is regressed on the daily changes in the log
exchange rates of the dollar, the yen, and the euro—or the ECU before the introduc-
tion of the euro on January 1, 1999. All exchange rates are again expressed vis-à-vis
the Swiss franc. More specifically, we estimate the following regression equation:
∆ e
j
t = α + β 1∆ e
USD
t + β 2∆ e
JY
t + β 3∆ e
EURO
t + vt, 
where ∆ e
j
t is the daily change in the log exchange rate of currency j on day t, α is 
a constant term, β k (k = 1, 2, . . .) is the coefficient on the daily change in the 
log exchange rate of currency k, and vt is the residual term. The superscripts USD, 
JY, and EURO, respectively, refer to the dollar, the yen, and the euro. As in the 
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19. Though not indicated in the table, it is well known that Singapore has been under a currency basket-based 
managed floating arrangement since 1985.previous case, the estimated coefficients are interpreted as the weights assigned by the
authorities to the corresponding currencies in their exchange rate policies. Similarly,
the estimated standard error of regression residuals can be interpreted as a measure 
of exchange rate volatility.
Table 6 summarizes the regression results for each emerging economy in East Asia
over the sample period January 1990 through June 2002. The sample is divided 
into 18-month sub-samples. The mid-crisis period (July 1997–December 1998) is
indicated by the shaded areas.
1. Pre-crisis period
Table 6 confirms that in the pre-crisis period (January 1990–June 1997), the 
estimated coefficients of the dollar were statistically significant and close to unity, the
adjusted R
2 was close to one, and the estimated standard error of regression was 
small for almost all economies—particularly Hong Kong, Korea, Indonesia, and
Thailand (for the first half of the 1990s). In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, the
dollar coefficients were somewhat lower, though generally greater than 0.75 and
highly significant, due to their formal or informal currency basket arrangements. 
In the case of Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand (for the 18 months prior to the 
baht crisis) and China (the first half of the 1990s), the adjusted R
2 was somewhat
lower and the estimated standard error of regression somewhat higher. In Thailand,
speculative activity that had begun in 1996 and mounted in February and May 1997
had already affected the currency movement prior to the outbreak of the baht crisis.
These results support the proposition that many emerging East Asian economies
were on de jure or de facto dollar-stabilization arrangements until the time of the 
crisis. Nonetheless, the estimated coefficients of the yen were also significant, for
some sub-sample periods, in Singapore, Thailand, Korea, and Malaysia, though the
size of its coefficients rarely exceeded 0.1. In this sense, the yen played a limited role
as part of a currency basket in the pre-crisis period. The euro—more accurately, its
predecessor, the ECU—also played some role in Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand
due to the nature of their currency basket arrangements, though it was relatively
insignificant in other countries.
20
2. Mid-crisis period
Not surprisingly, many former crisis countries in East Asia experienced noticeable
declines in dollar weights and in the adjusted R
2 in the mid-crisis period (July
1997–December 1998). This was particularly pronounced in Indonesia and
Thailand. In the case of Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the estimated 
coefficients on the dollar did not decline noticeably, but the adjusted R
2 declined
sharply and the estimated standard error of regression rose sharply.
21 Even economies
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20. The observed role of the yen and the euro—or the ECU—in a currency basket for some countries such as Singapore,
however, may reflect the fact that the authorities chose the SDR as a target in their exchange rate management. The
yen and the European currencies—making up a major part of the ECU—were important components of the SDR.
21. The less noticeable decline in the dollar coefficient in Malaysia may be explained by the authorities’ move to fix 
the Malaysian ringgit to the dollar on September 2, 1998. If the mid-crisis sample period were shortened to, say, 
July 1997–August 1998, the decline in dollar coefficients would be more pronounced. A series of three-month
rolling regressions strongly indicates this tendency (see details in the Appendix Table of the working paper version,
downloadable from http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/english/publication/edps/2002/02-E-17.pdf). The rolling regression
procedure allows us to analyze the mid-crisis period more carefully because of regional contagion, delayed currency
attacks (Indonesia and Korea), and large exchange rate depreciations at times of political uncertainty (Indonesia).184 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES (SPECIAL EDITION)/DECEMBER 2002
Table 6  Regression Results of Exchange Rate Movements for Major Emerging East
Asian Economies: Pre-Crisis, Mid-Crisis, and Post-Crisis Periods (Daily Data)
[1] Hong Kong Dollar
Period Const.
U.S. 
Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 –0.014 0.993** –0.001 0.007 0.9973 1.566 0.000425 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.008 0.998** –0.011 0.006 0.9956 2.579 0.000597 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 –0.004 0.995** 0.000 0.003 0.9975 2.147 0.000358 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 0.002 0.997** 0.000 0.002 0.9994 2.018 0.000204 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.004 0.997** 0.009** –0.007 0.9977 2.598 0.000277 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 0.000 1.001** 0.006* 0.000 0.9938 2.773 0.000528 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.016** 0.993** 0.001 0.003 0.9998 2.116 0.000087 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.000 1.004** 0.000 –0.002 0.9999 2.054 0.000061 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.172 1.004** –0.013 –0.011 0.9336 1.968 0.002149 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 0.210 1.026** –0.016 –0.006 0.8098 2.005 0.004458 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 0.045 1.014** –0.021* –0.002 0.9720 2.255 0.001208 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 –0.127 0.983** 0.081** –0.045* 0.9329 2.008 0.002205 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.354** 0.960** 0.065** 0.020 0.8583 1.804 0.002378 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 0.758 1.149** 0.039 0.084 0.0921 1.607 0.024301 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 –0.172 1.044** 0.063* –0.036 0.7220 1.645 0.004023 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.256 0.982** 0.284** –0.056 0.7550 2.107 0.004476 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 –0.212 0.739** 0.065** 0.199** 0.9167 2.309 0.002188 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.140 0.758** 0.077** 0.185** 0.9482 2.309 0.001857 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 –0.160 0.865** 0.049** 0.098** 0.9199 2.131 0.001960 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 –0.189 0.789** 0.098** 0.117** 0.9383 2.052 0.001915 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 –0.019 0.798** 0.096** 0.144** 0.9294 2.167 0.001503 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 0.381 0.635** 0.342** 0.190* 0.4851 2.181 0.006911 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.103 1.219** 0.123** –0.194** 0.8505 1.925 0.002547 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.035 0.948** 0.197** –0.089* 0.8975 1.942 0.002236 392
Jan. 2002–June 2002 –0.170 0.610** 0.223** 0.064 0.8731 2.019 0.000346 124
Notes: 1. Daily exchange rate data, obtained from Datastream, are used for regression analysis.
2. Double asterisks and a single asterisk indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at
the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.185
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Table 6  (continued)
[4] New Taiwan Dollar
Period Const.
U.S. 
Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.040 0.840** –0.017 0.240** 0.4605 2.849 0.008475 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.154 0.967** 0.033 –0.003 0.6336 2.913 0.006803 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 0.193 1.012** 0.055 –0.019 0.6664 2.875 0.005199 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 0.023 0.948** 0.060* 0.028 0.8956 2.022 0.002807 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.024 0.946** 0.036 –0.001 0.8264 2.734 0.002573 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 0.382 0.867** 0.090** 0.068 0.5698 1.702 0.005472 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 –0.131 0.999** –0.007 –0.012 0.8920 2.289 0.002128 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.322** 1.019** 0.000 –0.017 0.9030 1.799 0.002248 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.227 0.962** 0.029 0.030 0.9094 2.084 0.002555 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 0.145** 0.997** –0.006 0.016 0.9903 2.292 0.000900 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 0.131* 0.995** 0.010 –0.002 0.9739 2.044 0.001161 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 0.153* 0.994** –0.015 0.011 0.9710 2.004 0.001438 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.156* 1.009** 0.001 0.002 0.9372 2.165 0.001528 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 2.982 0.512 0.692* –0.067 0.0167 1.961 0.053151 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.290 2.147* 0.270** –0.643 0.1880 1.689 0.015509 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.354 1.423** 0.140 –0.138 0.3370 1.719 0.012363 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.072 0.892** 0.027** 0.096** 0.9739 2.207 0.001279 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.138 0.874** 0.025 0.090** 0.9487 2.006 0.001944 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 0.004 0.906** 0.001 0.020 0.8170 1.507 0.003072 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 –0.062 0.869** 0.059** 0.084** 0.9532 1.970 0.001738 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 –0.049 0.885** 0.034* 0.086** 0.9226 2.018 0.001611 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 1.032 0.883** 0.300** –0.035 0.1862 1.742 0.014911 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.000 1.043** 0.000 –0.019** 0.9980 2.943 0.000265 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.000 1.000** 0.000 0.000 1.0000 3.040 0.000000 392
Jan. 2002–June 2002 0.000 1.000** 0.000 0.000 1.0000 2.919 0.000000 124
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Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.571 1.054** 0.043 –0.048 0.6891 2.011 0.005762 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.363 1.048** –0.110 0.101 0.6700 1.991 0.006458 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 0.309 0.973** –0.006 –0.026 0.6154 2.013 0.005375 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 –0.045 0.986** 0.062 –0.059 0.7805 2.221 0.004306 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.020 1.004** –0.005 –0.002 0.9936 2.202 0.000469 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 0.998 0.876** 0.285** –0.022 0.1924 1.716 0.014420 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.268 1.410** 0.085** –0.243* 0.7190 1.968 0.006247 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.406 0.779* 0.116 0.093 0.4460 2.067 0.008187 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.014 0.961** 0.031* 0.023 0.9543 2.034 0.001766 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 –0.017 0.957** 0.019 0.043** 0.9782 2.007 0.001334 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 –0.037 0.972** 0.012 0.006 0.9778 2.040 0.001049 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 0.017 0.877** 0.069** 0.049** 0.9882 2.410 0.000848 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 –0.053 0.823** 0.178** 0.154 0.4746 1.978 0.006179 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 1.014 0.608** 0.311** 0.099 0.1046 1.877 0.017221 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.178 1.432** 0.130** –0.297* 0.6291 1.933 0.008783 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.189 0.971** 0.197** –0.069 0.7902 1.980 0.003625 392




Yen Euro Adj. R
2 D.W. Std-res No. obs. dollar
Jan. 1990–June 1991 0.317 1.025** –0.036 0.007 0.7145 2.007 0.005179 389
July 1991–Dec. 1992 0.211 1.037** –0.041 –0.032 0.8889 2.042 0.003212 394
Jan. 1993–June 1994 1.037 0.969** 0.082 0.064 0.1159 2.007 0.019926 390
July 1994–Dec. 1995 –0.113* 1.030** –0.001 –0.030** 0.9829 2.082 0.001116 391
Jan. 1996–June 1997 0.000 1.018** –0.010 –0.012 0.9335 2.832 0.001569 391
July 1997–Dec. 1998 –0.008 0.996** 0.001 –0.002 0.9919 2.471 0.000597 393
Jan. 1999–June 2000 0.000 1.002** 0.000 –0.001 0.9999 2.019 0.000033 390
July 2000–Dec. 2001 0.000 0.998** 0.000 0.001 1.0000 2.326 0.000043 392
Jan. 2002–June 2002 0.000 1.001** –0.001* 0.000 1.0000 2.121 0.000018 124
Notes: 1. Daily exchange rate data, obtained from Datastream, are used for regression analysis.
2. Double asterisks and a single asterisk indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at
the 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.not directly affected by the crisis, such as Singapore and Taiwan, also saw declines in
the dollar coefficients and in the adjusted R
2. In the case of Singapore, the central
rates were changed a few times to weather the currency crisis occurring in the 
neighboring countries. But these changes were much less pronounced than those 
for the former crisis country currencies. Hong Kong and China were relatively
immune to currency speculation as far as the observed movements of spot exchange
rates are concerned.
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As the dollar weights declined in the mid-crisis period, the weights of the yen rose
in a significant way in some countries, particularly in Indonesia, Singapore,
Thailand, and Malaysia. The size of the yen coefficients jumped upward to 0.7 in
Indonesia and to 0.3 in other countries. Only in Korea and China were the yen 
coefficients statistically insignificant. The euro coefficients were relatively unaffected
by the crisis. Generally speaking, the importance of the yen in the currency baskets of
many countries rose during the crisis, while the euro’s importance did not.
3. Post-crisis period
The results for the post-crisis period (January 1999–June 2002) indicate a greater
diversity in exchange rate arrangements than in the pre-crisis period. A few countries
have returned to the pre-crisis pattern of dollar-based exchange rate arrangement,
while others have departed from the pre-crisis arrangement. At one extreme,
economies under a stable dollar peg throughout the period, such as China and Hong
Kong, have maintained dollar coefficients at levels close to unity, the adjusted R
2
close to one, and an estimated standard error of regression even smaller than in the 
pre-crisis period. Malaysia returned to a formal dollar-peg arrangement, and the
regression result indeed confirms it. Taiwan has been stabilizing the currency to 
the dollar in a way tighter than in the pre-crisis period, as judged from a larger size 
of the adjusted R
2 and a smaller size of the estimated standard error of regression. 
Indonesia is at the other extreme where, despite large coefficients on the dollar 
in some post-crisis sub-sample periods, the adjusted R
2 is much lower and the 
estimated standard error of regression much higher than in the pre-crisis period. In
this sense, Indonesia has been maintaining an exchange rate arrangement that is most
akin to freely floating among the emerging East Asian economies, despite the fact
that Bank Indonesia has often intervened in the foreign exchange market to
smooth the rupiah/dollar exchange rate. Essentially, Indonesia has not been able
to restore exchange rate stability despite interventions, because of the country’s
difficult economic—and social and political—problems.
In between these two groups, there are countries that exhibit statistically significant
dollar coefficients but with a lower value (the Philippines) or with a lower adjusted R
2
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22. Though the spot exchange rate data do not reveal it, the Hong Kong dollar was under serious attack in August
1998. The authorities resorted to unorthodox measures to contain speculative pressures, by intervening in the
stock market and purchasing HK$118 billion of domestic equities in a period of about two weeks. They inter-
vened in the stock market because speculators shorted the currency and stock markets simultaneously, 
hoping to profit from the lower stock prices that could result from high interest rates needed to support the
exchange rate under the pressure of short selling the Hong Kong dollar. This intervention was also accompanied
by a variety of regulatory measures, including increases in the cost of speculation in financial markets—tighter
enforcement of rules on short selling and settlement of trades, and higher margin requirements in the futures
markets. Aided by an improvement in the external environment, the intervention eventually succeeded in 
calming the markets.(Korea, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines). What is interesting for these 
countries is that the yen coefficients take values of 0.2–0.3 and are statistically 
significant, except for the Philippines, and the dollar coefficients in the most recent
sub-sample periods are lower than in the pre-crisis period. For these economies, 
one cannot conclude that they have reverted to pre-crisis dollar-based exchange rate
stabilization policies or that they have shifted to freely floating exchange rate arrange-
ments. Their exchange rates are more flexible than in the pre-crisis period, but more 
stable than those of a typical free-floating industrial country. Korea and Thailand, in
particular, appear to have shifted tode facto managed floating with a currency basket
arrangement with a relatively large weight on the dollar (on the order of 0.6–0.7) and
a smaller, but significant, weight on the yen (on the order of 0.2–0.3). The observed
pattern of these countries’ de facto basket arrangements is very similar to that of
Singapore, which is known to have maintained a managed float with a currency basket
system. It remains to be seen whether this shift reflects a permanent change in these
countries’ exchange rate policies or a temporary adjustment of their exchange rates 
to the recent rapid yen/dollar rate movements.
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C. Rationale for and Problems of Dollar-Based Stabilization Policy
Despite post-crisis diversity in exchange rate arrangements, the fact is that the dollar
continues to play a dominant anchor currency role in emerging economies in East
Asia.
24 The East Asian currencies with a large weight on the dollar in their currency
baskets in the pre-crisis period became overvalued on a real, effective basis due to
both higher domestic inflation than in the United States and the dollar’s appreciation
since mid-1995 vis-à-vis the major industrialized currencies, particularly the yen and
the deutschemark. The emergence of real, effective overvaluation of the currencies
was an important factor behind the mounting speculative pressure that developed in
the foreign exchange market in 1997.
25 Hence, the de facto dollar-peg system was one
of the underlying triggers of the currency crisis. The issue is whether the continued
importance of the dollar, including the post-crisis resurrection of the dollar standard
(McKinnon [2001]) in some countries, is a desirable and sustainable arrangement for
East Asia. We must discuss the issues of the “peg” and the “dollar” separately.
1. De facto currency stabilization
The first question is why many emerging East Asian economies have chosen de jure
or de facto currency stabilization rather than “pure floating.” First, emerging
economies in East Asia preferred exchange rate stability, reflecting their desire to 
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23. Kawai and Akiyama (2000) and McKinnon (2000, 2001) have observed a reversion of the post-crisis exchange
rate arrangement of emerging East Asia to an arrangement akin to the pre-crisis de facto dollar-based stabilization
policies. Their analyses were based on data until 1999 or early 2000. But, as shown in the text, with longer time-
series data available, one can observe a variety of exchange rate arrangements in post-crisis East Asia, ranging from
a dollar hard peg (Hong Kong) and a soft peg (China and Malaysia) to a managed float with currency basket
arrangements (Singapore, Korea, and Thailand), and to freely floating (Indonesia).
24. The relatively high dollar weights observed in the post-crisis regressions, with the exception of Indonesia, may
indicate that the monetary authorities continue to regard the dollar as the most relevant anchor currency for 
their exchange rate policies despite their stated objective of free floating (with the notable exception of Malaysia),
or that the market is simply driving each country’s exchange rate in parallel with the dollar. Whatever the 
interpretation, the dollar continues to play a dominant, reference currency role in the region. 
25. This was compounded with weaknesses of the domestic financial institutions, particularly in Thailand, which
triggered the twin crises in the domestic financial system and the external capital account.promote trade and FDI for economic growth. Excessive exchange rate movements
under free floating have been considered inappropriate for outward-oriented
economies, because of the harmful impacts on trade, investment, and economic
growth. Small, open, and highly trade-dependent economies, like those in East Asia,
benefit from exchange rate stability through creating predictable environments 
for trade- and FDI-driven economic development and growth, and avoiding 
regional beggar-thy-neighbor policies of competitive depreciation. McKinnon (2000)
claims that exchange rate stability was an important factor behind the remarkable
economic performance during the “East Asian miracle” period of the mid-1960s
through the mid-1990s. 
Second, the emerging economies in East Asia needed to establish a nominal anchor
due to the lack of credible monetary policy, to rely on foreign currency for external
financing due to the so-called “original-sin” hypothesis (Eichengreen and Hausmann
[1999] and Hausmann [2001]), or simply to overcome their “fear of floating” (Calvo
and Reinhart [2002]). “Original sin” is a situation where emerging economy residents
cannot borrow abroad in domestic currency nor borrow long term, even domestically.
Hence domestic banks and corporations tend to face a currency mismatch or a 
maturity mismatch or both, thus creating balance-sheet vulnerabilities to sharp
exchange rate changes. Given that hedging instruments—currency futures and
options—are not fully available in these markets due to the lack of well-functioning
domestic bond markets (McKinnon and Schnabl [2002]), the government tends to
stabilize exchange rates to mitigate the potential foreign exchange risk.
26
2. De facto dollar-based stabilization
Rapid economic development and growth in the emerging East Asian economies in the
10 years prior to the outbreak of the crisis had been stimulated by their stabilization to
the dollar. In the face of steep yen rate appreciation that began in the mid-1980s, the
de facto dollar-pegged system allowed these economies to receive FDI from Japan 
and to integrate themselves into the regional and global trading system. As Japan 
had already been gradually losing its international price-competitiveness in low- to
mid-tech manufacturing products, yen rate appreciation accelerated this process by
forcing Japanese multinational corporations to move their production facilities 
to emerging East Asia. From the latter’s perspectives, their exchange rate depreciation
vis-à-vis the yen helped transform them into attractive production bases and platforms,
for Japanese multinationals, to export products to the U.S. and European markets. This
process promoted international division of labor in the manufacturing sector within the
region and helped these economies industrialize and grow, at least until early 1995,
when the yen rate started to depreciate rapidly.
Thus, there is no doubt that the emerging East Asian economies enjoyed large
benefits, for a long time until the mid-1990s, by choosing the dollar as an anchor 
for exchange rate stabilization. But it is hard to argue that these economies adopted a
de facto dollar peg, expecting such developmental benefits arising from the yen’s
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26. In economies like the United States, Japan, or Western Europe, free floating is less harmful, because the financial
markets are deeper and economic systems are more resilient. But emerging market economies with shallow 
financial and currency markets have limited ability to absorb large exchange rate fluctuations. For these reasons,
the authorities in the emerging market economies have preferred some degree of exchange rate stability.appreciation. So the next question is why the East Asian economies have chosen 
the dollar as an anchor currency for exchange rate stabilization. Several reasons can 
be given.
First, the dollar has been chosen because it has been used extensively as an 
invoicing currency for international trade and as a vehicle currency for foreign
exchange transactions in East Asia and in other parts of the world.
27 For each East
Asian economy, stabilizing the value of its trade and transactions in terms of the dollar
was a reasonable policy given that its neighbors and many other countries in the world
willingly used the dollar for trade invoicing and foreign exchange market transactions. 
Second, because the bond and forward exchange markets have not been developed
adequately in emerging East Asia, governments have been induced to provide an
informal hedge by stabilizing the exchange rate against the dollar. Considering the
risk of exchange rate fluctuations, the reliance on the dollar made sense, because 
forward transactions were more active—though still limited—in the dollar markets
than in markets for other currencies. 
Third, a dollar-based system was an arrangement that implicitly guaranteed 
intra-regional exchange rate stability for the East Asian economies. Several authors have
noted that thede facto dollar-based system has helped promote intra-regional exchange
rate stability, an important policy objective for a highly interdependent region such as
East Asia (Bayoumi et al. [2000] and McKinnon [2000]). The arrangement essentially
prevented, at least until the 1997–98 crisis, harmful beggar-thy-neighbor exchange rate
competition, thereby ensuring environments conducive to outward-oriented economic
growth for the region as a whole.
3. Problems of dollar-based stabilization
Even though some degree of exchange rate stability is desirable for the emerging East
Asian economies, there are several problems associated with choosing the dollar as the
sole nominal anchor currency in these economies.
First, using the dollar as the sole anchor is problematic given that the emerging
East Asian economies have diverse economic relationships with the United States,
Japan, and the EU through trade (exports and imports), FDI inflows, and other
forms of capital flows. For emerging East Asia, the United States is no longer the
most dominant economic partner and the relative importance of Japan and the EU is
as large as, and in some cases much larger than, that of the United States. The United
States accounts for 18 percent, while Japan and the EU respectively account for 
17 percent and 14 percent, of emerging East Asia’s trade (Table 7). Japan and the
United States are comparable partners as an FDI source country (Table 8). 
Second, against the benefit of intra-regional exchange rate stability guaranteed by
the informal dollar-based arrangements, there is a cost in terms of excessive movements
in effective exchange rates induced by yen/dollar rate fluctuations. When the yen began
to depreciate vis-à-vis the dollar in the spring of 1995, emerging East Asian economies
saw their international price-competitiveness deteriorate. Growth driven by Japanese
FDI inflows began to lose its momentum. In addition, yen depreciation dampened real
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27. Commodities and primary products exported by many developing countries tend to be priced in the dollar in 
the global markets.191
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Table 7  Regional Breakdown of East Asian Trade, Average for 1990–98 







EA-14 United European Rest  of  World
Exports to East Asia and Japan States Union the world total
Brunei Darussalam  21.1 16.3 37.4 55.6 93.0 2.7 2.2 2.1 100.0
Cambodia 56.8 5.5 62.3 6.7 69.0 6.0 18.6 6.4 100.0
Indonesia 14.2 16.6 30.8 29.3 60.1 13.8 14.5 11.5 100.0
Laos 46.5 5.3 51.9 10.7 62.6 2.6 18.0 16.8 100.0
Malaysia 28.2 13.6 41.7 13.2 54.9 19.2 14.8 11.0 100.0
Myanmar 22.2 20.4 42.6 7.4 50.0 7.2 8.4 34.4 100.0
Philippines 10.1 11.4 21.5 17.0 38.5 36.5 18.2 6.7 100.0
Singapore 26.1 17.2 43.2 7.7 50.9 19.6 14.4 15.1 100.0
Thailand 17.3 11.0 28.3 16.5 44.8 20.7 18.2 16.3 100.0
Vietnam 20.3 18.1 38.4 24.4 62.8 2.0 12.2 23.0 100.0
China 6.3 35.4 41.7 16.7 58.4 15.1 12.2 14.2 100.0
Hong Kong 6.6 36.2 42.8 5.7 48.5 22.7 16.1 12.7 100.0
Korea 12.4 16.4 28.8 14.0 42.8 21.4 12.8 23.0 100.0
Taiwan 11.7 22.6 34.3 11.0 45.2 27.0 15.0 12.8 100.0
ASEAN 22.1 14.9 37.0 15.4 52.4 19.1 15.2 13.3 100.0
EA-14 13.6 23.7 37.2 12.9 50.1 20.7 14.5 14.6 100.0







EA-14 United European Rest  of  World
Imports from East Asia and Japan States Union the world total
Brunei Darussalam 41.5 6.3 47.8 10.8 58.6 14.0 21.4 6.0 100.0
Cambodia 57.5 13.6 71.2 9.9 81.1 1.6 9.7 7.6 100.0
Indonesia 11.5 15.6 27.2 22.1 49.2 11.8 20.2 18.7 100.0
Laos 61.8 8.8 70.6 9.4 80.0 0.5 3.7 15.8 100.0
Malaysia 19.9 13.7 33.7 24.9 58.5 16.6 14.2 10.6 100.0
Myanmar 41.7 31.6 73.2 9.5 82.7 1.4 9.0 7.0 100.0
Philippines 11.3 17.6 28.9 21.2 50.1 19.5 11.0 19.4 100.0
Singapore 21.2 13.9 35.2 20.0 55.2 16.3 13.4 15.1 100.0
Thailand 13.1 13.0 26.1 28.4 54.6 12.1 15.2 18.2 100.0
Vietnam 28.4 26.4 54.8 9.9 64.7 1.0 10.2 24.0 100.0
China 7.0 29.2 36.1 19.5 55.6 11.7 15.0 17.7 100.0
Hong Kong 9.1 50.7 59.9 15.2 75.1 7.6 10.3 7.0 100.0
Korea 8.0 7.5 15.5 23.0 38.5 22.2 13.1 26.2 100.0
Taiwan 9.9 7.9 17.7 28.5 46.2 21.0 14.9 17.8 100.0
ASEAN 18.0 14.6 32.7 22.6 55.2 14.8 14.5 15.5 100.0
EA-14 12.1 22.5 34.6 21.4 56.0 14.6 13.5 15.8 100.0
EA-14 and Japan 12.7 21.5 34.2 15.3 49.4 17.0 13.8 19.8 100.0
Note: Other East Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. The EA-14 includes ASEAN and Other East Asia.
Source: Kawai and Takagi (2000). Constructed from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
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EA-14 United European Rest  of  World
Trade with East Asia and Japan States Union the world total
Brunei Darussalam 30.2 11.8 42.0 36.4 78.4 7.3 10.4 3.9 100.0
Cambodia 58.8 10.6 69.4 9.0 78.4 3.5 11.6 6.5 100.0
Indonesia 12.9 16.2 29.1 26.0 55.1 13.0 17.1 14.8 100.0
Laos 55.3 7.6 62.9 11.1 74.0 1.2 8.5 16.3 100.0
Malaysia 24.0 13.6 37.7 19.0 56.6 17.9 14.6 10.8 100.0
Myanmar 34.8 27.8 62.6 8.7 71.3 3.3 8.7 16.6 100.0
Philippines 10.8 15.1 25.9 19.5 45.4 26.3 13.9 14.3 100.0
Singapore 23.5 15.5 39.1 14.1 53.1 17.9 13.9 15.1 100.0
Thailand 15.1 12.1 27.2 23.0 50.2 16.0 16.6 17.3 100.0
Vietnam 24.8 23.0 47.8 16.3 64.1 1.4 11.0 23.5 100.0
China 6.6 32.4 39.0 18.1 57.1 13.5 13.5 15.9 100.0
Hong Kong 7.9 43.7 51.6 10.6 62.1 15.0 13.1 9.8 100.0
Korea 10.1 11.9 22.0 18.6 40.6 21.7 13.0 24.6 100.0
Taiwan 10.8 15.6 26.5 19.2 45.7 24.2 15.0 15.1 100.0
ASEAN 19.9 14.7 34.7 19.1 53.8 16.9 14.8 14.5 100.0
EA-14 12.8 23.1 35.9 17.2 53.0 17.7 14.1 15.2 100.0
EA-14 and Japan 13.3 22.4 35.6 11.7 47.3 20.5 14.8 17.5 100.0
Note: Other East Asia includes China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan. The EA-14 includes ASEAN and Other East Asia.
Source: Kawai and Takagi (2000). Constructed from International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.
Table 8  FDI Inflows to East Asia, 1990–98
US$ millions, percentage of total
Recipients
ASEAN
1 China Korea Taiwan Total Investors
Japan
57,693 29,715 2,769 4,935 95,112
(19.2) (5.5) (10.5) (22.7) (10.7)
United States
35,082 42,658 9,331 3,885 90,956
(11.7) (7.9) (35.3) (17.8) (10.3)
Europe
2 40,375 27,311 8,935 2,484 79,105
(13.4) (5.1) (33.8) (11.4) (8.9)
ASEAN
27,493 33,421 3,271 1,108 65,293
(9.1) (6.2) (12.4) (5.1) (7.4)
Other East Asia
3 46,731 336,132 551 1,571 384,985
(15.5) (62.4) (2.1) (7.2) (43.4)
Total, including  301,074 538,477 26,422 21,778 887,751
others (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0) (100.0)
Notes: 1. 1991–98 for Brunei and Vietnam, 1992–98 for the Philippines, and 1994–98 for Cambodia.
Notes: 2. These figures underestimate the actual volumes, because some countries with small 
volumes are not included.
Notes: 3. Hong Kong, Korea, and Taiwan only.
Source: Kawai and Takagi (2000). Constructed from ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report
1999: Trends and Developments in Foreign Direct Investment, Jakarta, 1999; Japan External
Trade Organization.
Table 7  (continued)economic activity in relatively advanced emerging East Asian economies (such as Korea,
Taiwan, and Malaysia) that competed against Japan in third markets in the United
States and Europe. If the yen had continued to experience the “ever higher yen syn-
drome” (McKinnon and Ohno [1997]), then exchange rate stabilization vis-à-vis the
dollar would have been attractive to emerging East Asia. Once the yen/dollar exchange
rate became volatile, however, dollar-based exchange rate regimes began to produce
wide fluctuations of economic activity, severely limiting its benefits. The reason for the
close association between yen/dollar exchange rate movements and the real economic
activity of some emerging East Asian economies (Kwan [2001]) is that they not only
trade with Japan, but also compete with Japan in third markets in certain products.
The diverse economic linkages of emerging East Asia with the rest of the 
world suggest that exchange rate stabilization vis-à-vis the dollar alone is not the best
policy. Rate stabilization vis-à-vis a well-balanced currency basket comprising the 
dollar, the yen, and the euro is a more reasonable option. The reason is that exchange
rate stabilization against a currency of one major trading partner means the lack 
of exchange rate stability against currencies of other major trading partners as 
long as the exchange rates of these major countries fluctuate in a volatile way. A 
currency basket arrangement ensures relative stability of a country’s effective exchange
rates vis-à-vis major trading partners.
28 This approach offers a better buffer to an
economy’s exposure to yen/dollar and dollar/euro exchange rate volatility.
29
IV. Future of East Asian Exchange Rate Arrangements
A. Options for Possible Arrangements
While the popular “two-corner solution” view gives exclusive attention to the objec-
tive of crisis prevention, emerging market economies can pursue other legitimate
objectives such as growth, trade, and investment promotion through their use of
exchange rate policy.
30 A desirable option for many emerging market economies,
including those in East Asia, would be neither a pure float because of the potential
for excessive volatility and misalignment and the pervasive “fear of floating,” nor a
hard peg except in a very small open economy like Hong Kong.
In view of the impossibility of any country achieving a trinity of simultaneous
exchange rate stability, monetary policy autonomy, and free mobility of capital, the
authorities must make a desirable trade-off. Given the open capital account in most
of emerging East Asia (except in China), a desirable trade-off would be to ensure a
certain degree of monetary policy autonomy and a certain degree of exchange rate
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28. As discussed in Kawai and Akiyama (2000), an economy that has diversified trade and FDI relationships with the
major currency areas has strong potential for choosing a well-balanced currency basket.
29. A basket system would have preserved more stable effective exchange rates at the time when the dollar began to
appreciate in the spring of 1995, without resulting in a loss of international price-competitiveness or an 
overvaluation of currencies in emerging East Asia.
30. Adoption of the “two-corner solution” approach (Eichengreen [1994], Obstfeld and Rogoff [1995], and Fischer
[2001]) would be unrealistic, with a few exceptions for truly small, open economies—e.g., Hong Kong and
Brunei in the case of East Asia. As has been claimed  by Frankel (1999), no single-currency regime is suitable for
all countries at all times.stability. In China, where capital account transactions are still limited, the authorities
can pursue both stable exchange rates and relatively autonomous monetary policy.
Numerous proposals have been made on the choice of exchange rate arrangements
for East Asia, including the dollar standard (McKinnon [2001], McKinnon and
Schnabl [2002], and Mundell [2001]), a G-3 currency basket system (Williamson
[1999a, b, 2000, 2001], Kawai and Akiyama [2000], Kawai and Takagi [2000],
Ogawa and Ito [2000], French and Japanese Staff, Ministries of Finance [2001], and
Ito [2001]), and regional monetary union (Wyplosz [2001]). 
A proposal for the dollar standard emphasizes the advantage for the emerging East
Asian economies to use the existing, most dominant international currency in the
region, i.e., the dollar, while minimizing the yen/dollar exchange rate fluctuations.
The dollar standard is a formalization of the long-standing de facto arrangement, 
is simple and transparent, and involves no additional cost in ensuring both inter-
regional and intra-regional exchange rate stability. However, the dollar standard
would result in undesirable fluctuations in effective exchange rates as long as yen/
dollar exchange rate fluctuations continue. 
The G-3 currency basket system proposal claims that linking the central rate of a
country’s national currency to a basket of major G-3 currencies, i.e., the dollar, the
yen, and the euro, rather than the dollar alone, is more desirable. The tightness of 
the link and the currency weights may initially be left to each country’s choice, with
the possibility for closer coordination as the authorities increasingly realize the
importance of intra-regional exchange rate stability. The virtue of this system is that
it would prevent excessive fluctuations in effective exchange rates in the face of
volatile yen/dollar or euro/dollar rate movements, while allowing their currency some
flexibility to move within a certain range. 
Opponents of a G-3 currency basket system claim that it treats the yen asym-
metrically relative to other East Asian currencies, thus providing the Bank of Japan
with the ability to pursue an independent monetary policy, without paying formal
attention to the need for a stable value of the yen. To the extent that this special 
position of Japan may jeopardize the goal of intra-regional exchange rate stability,
Japan may also be encouraged to stabilize the external value of the yen. 
In the spirit of regional cooperation, a more symmetric approach may be taken,
e.g., an Asian Monetary System (patterned after the European Monetary System
[EMS]) or even East Asia’s own Economic and Monetary Union in the more distant
future. Advocates of regional monetary union would claim that in the long run, one
of the corner solutions of the “two-corner solution” approach—that is, introducing a
common currency through coordinated regional integration—may be feasible and
even desirable from optimal currency area criteria.
31
Such an approach makes sense, but only in the long run. The region may 
eventually develop a common currency arrangement, like the euro in Europe. 
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31. For example, Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1994) found that Northeast Asia (Japan, Korea, and Taiwan) and
Southeast Asia (Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and perhaps Thailand), in addition to Northern
Europe (but not the entirety of Western Europe), were respectively plausible candidates for monetary union.
Bayoumi et al. (2000) concluded that in terms of preparedness for monetary union, Asia in 1995 was not much
different from Continental Europe in 1987. But the lack of political commitment and institutional capacity
would make such a move difficult in the short to medium term.A common currency arrangement, however, cannot be expected to emerge in 
the near future, because of the absence of political commitment within the region, of 
formal region-wide trade arrangements, and of convergence in macroeconomic
and structural underpinnings. A common currency would require a substantially
closer coordination of economic policies and a much greater and sufficiently 
sustained buildup of institutional infrastructure. 
B. A Currency Basket System for Emerging East Asia
Though formation of regional monetary union may be desirable in the long run, a
more realistic approach for emerging East Asia would be to shift to a currency basket
system now, thereby absorbing the impact of yen/dollar volatility on their economies,
and then to start institution building, strive for deeper economic interdependence,
and achieve the convergence needed for future monetary integration.
Under a currency basket arrangement, a reasonable choice of anchor for exchange
rate stabilization is a currency basket that includes the dollar, the yen, and the euro in 
a more balanced way than in the pre-crisis period. Actual currency weights in the 
basket will depend on the relative importance of the United States, Japan, and the EU
as trade partners and FDI sources for each East Asian economy, future expectations 
of trend movements of the yen/dollar exchange rate, and the success of the newly 
introduced euro. The extent of exchange rate stability also depends on each economy’s
specific conditions and preferences.
1. Intra-regional exchange rate stability
The East Asian region has long enjoyed a market-driven integration process through
international trade and FDI within the frameworks of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation (APEC). The rising intra-regional interdependence through
trade and investment suggests that economies in the region can benefit from avoiding
large fluctuations in intra-regional exchange rates. This is particularly the case for the
members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which began to
implement the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) in January 2002 by lowering
tariffs on manufactured products below 5 percent. 
Essentially, large swings in exchange rates among closely interdependent
economies would be counterproductive, because they would alter international
price-competitiveness suddenly and make the prospective free trade agreement
unsustainable. One way to maintain stable currencies within East Asia is to adopt
similar currency baskets consisting of the dollar, the yen, and the euro and to loosely
stabilize their exchange rates to such baskets. This does not require formal agree-
ments on common baskets or frequent, concerted joint actions in the foreign
exchange markets. Instead, the members have only to choose similar baskets. As the
degree of intra-regional integration becomes deeper, however, more concerted actions
in the area of exchange rate, monetary, and fiscal policies may be called for. And 
the choice of a “common” currency basket on a formal basis, or even adoption of a
common currency unit, may become desirable.
32
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32. See Williamson (1999a, b, 2000).2. Consistency with inflation targeting
Monetary authorities in general cannot pursue simultaneously both nominal
exchange rate and inflation targets, when the capital account is open. However, if
inflation targeting is defined as a policy of achieving a weighted average of inflation
rates of the United States, Japan, and the EU and if nominal exchange rate targeting
is defined as a policy of stabilizing the nominal exchange rate vis-à-vis a basket of the
dollar, the yen, and the euro, then these two policies are in fact one and the same as
long as the same weights are chosen for inflation and exchange rate targeting, at least
in the long run when purchasing power parity (PPP) tends to hold.
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Nominal exchange rate targeting has one added advantage over inflation targeting
cum free floating: by removing the problems associated with a floating rate regime—
short-run volatility and medium-run misalignment of exchange rates—a policy of
nominal exchange rate targeting (with some bands) can better ensure exchange 
rate stability in a manner consistent with inflation targeting (with some bands). This
is particularly the case for East Asia, where the economies are small and relatively
open, so that domestic price inflation tends to reflect international price movements. 
In essence, a loose peg to a basket of the tripolar currencies can ensure stabilization 
of intra-regional exchange rates, while maintaining a targeted range of inflation rates.
3. A coordinated move to a currency basket system
Even when a currency basket system is desirable, it is not easy for any single emerging
East Asian economy to move away unilaterally from the existing dollar-based
arrangement to a new arrangement in which the relative weight of the dollar is
smaller and those of the yen and euro larger.
34 The reason is that when neighboring
countries stabilize their exchange rates primarily against the dollar, each economy
may not have sufficient incentive to unilaterally alter its own exchange rate policy.
Essentially, the situation is one of a less desirable equilibrium due to a coordination
failure.
35 This demonstrates the potential importance of collective action on the part
of emerging East Asia. A coordinated simultaneous move to a currency basket system
will result in a more desirable equilibrium situation (Ogawa and Ito [2000]).
At least initially, exchange rate policy coordination would simply require emerging
economies in the region to adopt a similar currency basket as an anchor. The 
operation of the regional currency basket arrangement requires less formality and
greater flexibility than the EMS of 1979–98 did in Europe, because the proposed
currency basket arrangement including currencies that are external to the region—in
contrast to internal currencies in the case of Europe’s ECU—does not immediately
demand a formal structure of monetary policy and exchange rate coordination. This
consideration is important, given the current lack of a commitment to full-fledged
regional financial cooperation in East Asia, the diversity in the level of economic 
and financial developments across countries, the dynamic nature of East Asian
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33. See Kawai and Takagi (2000).
34. Honohan and Lane (1999) emphasized the existence of strategic interdependence in the choice of exchange rate
regimes for neighboring countries that compete for exports in third markets and for FDI inflows.
35. Williamson (1999a) has characterized this informal dollar-based arrangement as a classic collective action 
problem, whereby each country is compelled to stay close to the dollar because of fears that appreciation vis-à-vis
the dollar would weaken its competitiveness against its regional competitors.economies with rapid structural changes, and possibly differing inflationary 
tendencies. Economies with different rates of inflation and productivity growth can
(and are expected to) adjust the central rates with respect to the basket differently
over the medium term. In the absence of sufficient convergence, adjustment for 
inflation and productivity growth differentials may be just as important as the choice
of the basket itself.
On a deeper level, as the region becomes more integrated and hence more 
prepared, in terms of both economic criteria and political climate, for a more 
permanent commitment to economic and monetary union, greater efforts should 
be made to build institutions capable of supporting such a commitment. Given
the possible endogeneity of the optimum currency area criteria (Frankel and Rose
[1998]), the process can be self-promoting.
C. Regional Financial Cooperation
Given deepening interdependence of the East Asian economies through trade and
investment, intra-regional exchange rate stability, possibly supported by a regional 
currency basket arrangement, calls for a stronger form of financial cooperation
among the authorities in the region. One country’s exchange rate adjustment can
have serious, competitive implications for its neighboring countries—hence a need
for cooperative behavior. Another good reason for regional cooperation is the fact
that crisis contagion tends to be concentrated within a region, as evidenced during
the 1997–98 crisis. 
Initiatives to strengthen regional financial cooperation in East Asia can be broken
down into two broad categories: financing arrangements and policy dialogue.
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1. Financing arrangements
The experience of the 1997–98 crisis has convinced many economies in East Asia 
that the role of the IMF as an international lender of last resort is limited and that a
regional financing facility can play a useful, complementary role for crisis prevention
and management, through timely and adequate provision of international liquidity 
in the face of currency attack, contagion, and crisis. 
Inspired by the successful financial support package for Thailand in August 1997,
Japan, with support from Korea and the ASEAN countries that participated in the
Thai package, proposed to establish an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) to supplement
IMF resources for crisis prevention, management, and resolution. However, the
United States and the IMF opposed this proposition on the grounds of moral hazard
and duplication. They argued that an East Asian country hit by a currency crisis
might bypass the tough conditionality of the IMF and receive easy money from 
the AMF, thereby creating potential for moral hazard, and that an AMF would be
redundant in the presence of an effective global crisis manager, the IMF.
Although an AMF was not created, the East Asian economies agreed on the Chiang
Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2001. The CMI has two components: strengthening the
long-standing ASEAN Swap Arrangement by extending its membership to all ASEAN
members and increasing the size of swap arrangements; and creating a new network of
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36. See Kuroda and Kawai (2002).bilateral swap and repurchase arrangements for the ASEAN+3 members, including
China, Japan, and Korea. The initiative is currently in progress; several bilateral swap
agreements have been concluded and several negotiations are underway (Table 9).
The basic framework and main principles of bilateral swap arrangements (BSAs)
under the CMI include linkages to the IMF, maturity, and interest. For example,
countries can borrow liquidity collateralized by domestic currencies with government
guarantees, rather than offering U.S. Treasury bonds as collateral. Members request-
ing liquidity support can immediately obtain short-term financial assistance for the
first 10 percent of the BSA facility without IMF programs, while the remaining 
90 percent is provided to the requesting member under an IMF program or an 
activated contingent credit line. The linkage to IMF conditionality is designed to
address the concern that the problems leading to balance of payments difficulties may
be fundamental in nature and that the potential moral hazard problem could be 
non-negligible.
37 These main principles, including the issue of IMF linkages, will 
be reviewed in May 2004.
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Table 9  Progress on the Chiang Mai Initiative (As of June 2002)
Bilateral swap arrangement Currencies Conclusion date Size
Japan–Korea Dollar/won July 4, 2001 US$7 billion
†
Japan–Thailand Dollar/baht July 30, 2001 US$3 billion
Japan–Philippines Dollar/peso Aug. 27, 2001 US$3 billion
Japan–Malaysia Dollar/ringgit Oct. 5, 2001 US$3.5 billion
†
China–Thailand Dollar/baht Dec. 6, 2001 US$2 billion
Japan–China Yen/renminbi Mar. 28, 2002 US$3 billion equivalent
China–Korea  Renminbi/won June 24, 2002 US$2 billion equivalent
Korea–Thailand
Dollar/won or 




Japan–Indonesia Under  negotiation
China–Philippines Under  negotiation
China–Malaysia To be negotiated in the near future
Note: The daggers indicate that the dollar amounts include the amounts committed under the New
Miyazawa Initiative, US$5 billion for Korea, and US$2.5 billion for Malaysia.
Source: Kuroda and Kawai (2002).
37. The swap is for a period of 90 days, renewable up to seven times, at an interest rate equivalent to the London
interbank offered rate (LIBOR) plus 150 basis points for the first drawing and first renewal. Thereafter, the 
premium rises by 50 basis points every two renewals, subject to a maximum of 300 basis points.
2. Policy dialogue processes
Regional policy dialogue processes are instrumental to the effective functioning of
regional financing arrangements. Several forums have been developed for regional policy
dialogue and economic surveillance. Three major initiatives include the ASEAN+3
Framework, the Manila Framework, and the Executive’s Meeting of East Asia-Pacific
Central Banks (EMEAP). In addition to these, there are other forums, including those
for trans-regional policy dialogue under APEC and the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM).The common objective of these processes is to strengthen policymaking capacity
through information exchanges, peer reviews, and recommendations for action at the
regional and national levels. For this purpose, each group monitors global economic
conditions, regional economic developments, capital flows, exchange rates, financial-
sector conditions, and macroeconomic structural and social policies. Monitoring and
analysis of the regional macroeconomic and structural conditions are indispensable
both for crisis prevention, because of the need to implement corrective policies, and
for crisis financing, because of the need to identify causes of a crisis and formulate
appropriate policy responses. 
The ASEAN+3 Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD) process is the most
important among these, particularly given the introduction of the CMI. Its purpose is
to strengthen policy dialogue, coordination, and collaboration on the financial and
macroeconomic issues of common interest, focusing initially on issues related to
macroeconomic risk management, monitoring of regional capital flows, strengthening
of the banking and financial systems, better corporate governance, reform of the
international financial architecture, and enhancing self-help and support mechanisms
in East Asia. Steps have been taken for cooperation in monitoring short-term capital
flows and developing a regional early warning system to assess regional financial 
vulnerabilities, with a view to preventing financial crises in the future.
D. Internationalization of the Yen
For the successful functioning of a currency basket system, and more broadly for
regional financial stability, the role of the yen must be increased. For greater inter-
national use of the yen, sufficient incentives must be provided to the private sector in
using the yen for international trade, investment, finance, and foreign exchange
transactions. A greater role of the yen can in turn induce regional central banks to
adopt a currency basket system. 
Ideally, the yen would improve its international status and play a regional key 
currency role in a tripolar international monetary system. In reality, as has been 
discussed in Section II, the international role of the yen has been quite limited. 
The dollar continues to play a dominant role as the key global currency, reflecting
not only the robust economic performance of the U.S. economy in the 1990s 
but also the dollar’s historical role and inertia. The euro is emerging as the No. 2
international currency. 
The dollar accounts for close to 50 percent of international bonds issued, more
than 40 percent of commercial banks’ external assets, almost 90 percent of foreign
exchange transactions in the global market, and 66 percent of foreign exchange
reserves held. The euro accounts for about 30 percent of international bonds issued,
27 percent of commercial banks’ external assets, almost 40 percent of foreign
exchange transactions, and only 12 percent of foreign exchange reserves. In contrast,
the yen accounts for less than 10 percent of international bonds issued and commer-
cial banks’ external assets, 23 percent of foreign exchange transactions, and 5 percent
of foreign exchange reserves. While the yen’s invoicing share of Japanese trade with
Asia has risen in the second half of the 1990s, the international status of the yen is
still too low to allow a tripolar monetary system to emerge.
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use. The first is to resume strong economic growth in Japan and regain market 
confidence in its economy, which has been undermined during the past 10 years of
economic stagnation and price deflation. Priorities should be given to restoring the
soundness of the financial system through acceleration of the disposal of non-
performing loans, enhancing total factor productivity growth through structural
reform—in particular, deregulation—and ensuring sustainability of the nation’s
public finance through fiscal consolidation.
Second, further opening and liberalization of the Japanese economy that 
contributes to larger volumes of its trade with the rest of the world would naturally
increase the trade-invoicing role of the yen. Japan’s trade as a share of GDP, which 
is currently one of the lowest among the OECD countries, needs to be increased 
substantially. In addition, further integration of the Japanese economy with emerging
East Asia would further encourage intra-industry trade and the associated use of 
the yen. In manufacturing products, currently 50 percent of Japan’s exports to, and
28 percent of its imports from, Asia are invoiced in the yen, and the yen invoicing
ratios are also high for trade with Europe. These shares, though still low compared
with those of the United States and Germany, are much higher than those for Japan’s
overall trade denominated in the yen. Greater manufacturing trade with Asia and
Europe will lead to greater use of the yen as a trade-invoicing currency.
Third, deeper foreign exchange and capital markets can induce the yen to serve as
an attractive investment currency. In the Tokyo foreign exchange market, for instance,
direct yen/euro trade comprises only one-fifth of euro/dollar trades in terms of 
volume. Development of direct transactions between the yen and non-dollar 
currencies, particularly the euro and East Asian currencies, can increase the role of the
yen in the foreign exchange market. The recent approval of the Korean authority to
allow Japanese banks to trade yen/won in Japan is a step in this direction. In addition,
liquid and deep capital markets can encourage yen-denominated investment and
financing, where risks are easily diversified. A number of measures have been taken 
in Japan to improve the efficiency of the capital market in recent years, following 
the “financial Big Bang.” These attempts include rationalization of stock exchanges,
corporatization and listing of the Tokyo Stock Exchange, introduction of withholding
tax exemption for Japanese government bond (JGB) interest payments on non-
residents, a review of the syndicate underwriting system for JGBs, and an attempt to
shorten the JGB settlement period to T+1. 
In the foreseeable future, the role of the dollar will continue to be significant,
because of the effects of inertia and history. Nonetheless, there still is room for the yen
to play a more important role as an international nominal anchor currency in East
Asia. The yen may come to share the nominal anchor role with the dollar in East Asia,
in the sense of receiving greater weights assigned by the East Asian authorities in 
their currency basket policies.
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38. Hence, the yen’s role in East Asia will not be as distinct as the one that was played by the deutschemark in the
EMS. Even in Western Europe, however, the nominal role of the deutschemark appears to have been shared by
the French franc and the ECU during the EMS period (Kawai and Akiyama [1998]).V. Concluding Remarks
The recent currency crisis in East Asia created a common trend toward more flexible
exchange rates, at least as an “official” regime in the affected countries (except for
Malaysia). During the crisis, the role of the dollar as an anchor currency clearly
declined in the affected countries. As the crisis subsided, emerging East Asia’s
exchange rate arrangements began to diverge in comparison to the pre-crisis pattern
of assigning a considerable weight to the dollar. Malaysia has restored a dollar-peg
arrangement after a short period of crisis-driven floating, while Indonesia has allowed
large fluctuations of the currency. In between these two polar cases, most countries
have adopted managed floating. Korea and Thailand particularly appear to have
shifted to a de facto managed-float, currency-basket arrangement with larger weights
on the yen, an arrangement akin to that of Singapore. 
The rest of the paper has proposed that emerging economies in East Asia, in 
the short to medium term, achieve real effective exchange rate stabilization by 
loosely tying their central rates to a currency basket, supported by consistent and 
sustainable macroeconomic policy. It has argued that (1) a system which ensures
intra-regional exchange rate stability will be beneficial for emerging East Asia to 
promote trade, FDI, and economic growth; (2) given the high degree of intra-regional
trade and the rising similarity of trade composition in East Asia, each economy’s
exchange rate policy should be directed toward maintaining intra-regional exchange
rate stability; and (3) in view of the sub-optimality of thede facto dollar peg policy as
an informal and uncoordinated mechanism of ensuring intra-regional stability, a
coordinated action can be profitably employed to shift the target of nominal
exchange rate stability to a similar currency basket, consisting of the dollar, the yen,
and the euro, which is broadly representative of the partner composition of the
region’s trade and FDI.
At least initially, regional currency stabilization to the basket does not have to be
rigid. Each economy may choose its own formal exchange rate arrangement, 
provided that a currency basket serves as the reference numeraire in the conduct of
exchange rate policy, be it a currency board, a soft peg, or a managed float with wide
margins. After the initial phase, the East Asian economies may agree on a common
basket and adopt policies that ensure tighter exchange rate stability against the 
basket. Such an arrangement is likely to contribute to the simultaneous stabilization
of intra-regional exchange rates as well as individual economies’ effective exchange
rates. It is a pragmatic policy option until greater political and institutional develop-
ments create an environment conducive to a more robust framework of monetary
and exchange rate policy coordination that is commensurate with trade and invest-
ment integration in the region. To that end, the regional economies are advised to
strengthen financial cooperation through various regional forums, such as ASEAN+3,
the Manila Framework Group and EMEAP, and trans-regional forums, such 
as APEC and ASEM, with a view to enhanced financing and policy dialogue 
mechanisms, which will help foster such a framework.
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Monetary Authority of Singapore
I. Introduction
Masahiro Kawai’s paper takes a stylized and practical approach in characterizing the
observed exchange rate arrangements in East Asia. In particular, the paper focuses 
on the role played by the U.S. dollar as an international anchor currency for the
exchange rate behavior of the East Asian economies before, during, and after the 
currency crisis. It concludes that the dollar continues to play a dominant anchor 
currency role for many economies in the region. A key proposal in this paper is for
these economies—given their diversified trade patterns—to loosely tie their central
rates to a balanced currency basket, comprising the G-3 currencies, i.e., the euro, 
dollar, and yen, to achieve stable real effective exchange rates.
In this discussion, we will first highlight the approaches concerning the choice 
of exchange rate regimes facing East Asian economies, and provide some empirical
evidence from a paper by my colleagues at the Monetary Authority of Singapore
(MAS) on the move toward somewhat more flexible arrangements after the crisis, as
observed in Kawai’s paper. Singapore’s exchange rate framework might also serve as a
useful case-study of how a small, open economy has tried to implement the currency
basket framework proposed in Kawai’s paper. Finally, as alluded to in the paper, 
the choice of the exchange rate per se is not the only consideration in the conduct 
of exchange rate policy. Policymakers need to take a multi-dimensional approach,
thinking hard about the macro- and microeconomic polices as well as supporting
institutions of the chosen exchange rate framework.
II. Approaches in Choosing Exchange Rate Regimes
Corden (2001) identifies in essence three approaches in choosing an exchange 
rate regime:
(1) Exchange rate stability—an implication of this approach is that the floating
rate creates undue instability or misalignment that is adverse for international
trade and capital movements.
(2) Real targets—this approach uses the nominal exchange rate as a policy 
instrument to adjust the real exchange rate to attain, together with fiscal 
policy, the targets of internal and external balance.
(3) A nominal anchor—in this approach, an anchor to a country’s inflation rate is
provided by fixing the exchange rate or the rate of crawl.
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39. I am grateful to Edward Robinson for useful input and discussion.A history of relatively low inflation for most East Asian countries leads us to rule
out the pressing need for a nominal anchor in this region. We also note that in the
continuum of exchange rate regimes, the corner solution of a fixed system accords 
the advantages of exchange rate stability but not that of achieving real targets.
Meanwhile, the reverse is true for the other corner solution of a flexible system. 
The open economy trilemma is also a particularly relevant consideration for the 
East Asian economies, since most are integrated in the world capital market. Given
the trade-offs involved, it seems unnecessary to go to the extremes of rigid fixity 
or free float; instead, adherence to some interior solution appears plausible (see
Frankel [1999]). 
III. Flexible Exchange Rates Enhanced Monetary Autonomy 
in East Asia
To confirm Kawai’s observation of East Asia’s move toward more flexible exchange
rate arrangements, we draw on the results of a past study on monetary policy in four
East Asian economies—namely, Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia after the
currency crisis (see MAS [2000]). The empirical evidence suggests that the first three
countries have transited from the pre-crisis quasi-dollar-peg regime to a more flexible
post-crisis exchange rate regime. In particular, the standard deviations of the daily
percentage change in the rupiah, baht, and won (the Indonesian, Thai, and Korean
currencies, respectively) against the dollar for the post-crisis period from January 2,
1999 to September 22, 2000, are compared against the daily volatility during the
pre-crisis period from January 2, 1995 to January 2, 1997 (Table 1). There has been
an increase in the standard deviation of the daily movements of the three currencies
from the pre- to post-crisis sample period, with the largest increase in volatility being
recorded for the rupiah. Indeed, the de jure regime classification after the crisis for all
three economies is a free float, within the inflation targeting framework that employs
interest rates as the key operating instrument. Meanwhile, Malaysia has pegged its
currency, the ringgit, to the dollar. 
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Table 1  Daily Exchange Rate Volatility
Period Indonesia Korea Thailand
Standard deviation of daily Jan. 2, 1995–Jan. 2, 1997 0.2061 0.2528 0.2223
percentage change Jan. 2, 1999–Sep. 22, 2000 1.8791 0.4016 0.5474
Source: MAS (2000).
The new frameworks adopted are presumably aimed at securing greater autonomy
in monetary policy management, while retaining the anchor on price stability. To
evaluate the degree of monetary independence the authorities of these countries
could exercise, the MAS study also examined the relationship between exchange 
rate flexibility and interest rate differentials. A short-term interest rate dynamic
model for the differential between the domestic and dollar interbank interest rates
was estimated using pre- and post-crisis observations from the four countries. The following discrete time approximation to a continuous-time short-term interest rate
adjustment model formulated in Chanet al. (1992) was used:
rt – rt–1 = α +β rt–1 + ε t, (1)
σ
2





where E(ε t/Ω t–1) = 0, E(ε
2
t/Ω t–1) = σ
2
t, Ω t–1 is the information set at time t – 1, and
σ
2
t is the conditional variance of interest rate change. The parameter of interest is β ,
which captures the speed of mean reversion toward the long-run mean following a
given shock.
Estimates from the model (Table 2) indicate that the spread between the domestic
and the U.S. interest rates exhibited slower mean-reversion for Indonesia and
Thailand after the crisis, as evidenced by the large fall in the respective estimates for
β . In the case of Korea, the post-crisis coefficient was not statistically significant. The
results indicate that the domestic interest rate tends to adjust much more slowly 
or not at all to movements in the U.S. rate, in which case the money market 
equilibrium is restored under the more flexible exchange rate regime through a more
significant adjustment in the nominal exchange rate. The relatively small estimated
value and the non-significance of the estimate for β in the case of Malaysia indicate
that the presence of capital flow restrictions has effectively severed the linkage
between domestic and foreign interest rates, despite the fact that the exchange rate
was fixed against the dollar.
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Table 2  Mean Reversion in Interest Rate Differential
Indonesia Korea Malaysia Thailand
Pre-crisis –0.0107 –0.0090 –0.0065 –0.0363
Mean reversion (Jan. 1995–Jan. 1997) (–1.957) (–1.945) (–1.804) (–2.947)
parameter (β ) Post-crisis –0.0038 –0.0206 –0.00045 –0.0088
(Jan. 1999–Sep. 2000) (–4.022) (–1.469) (–0.039) (–2.474)
Note: Figures in parentheses are the Bollerslev and Wooldridge t-values.
Source: MAS (2000).
IV. Singapore’s Experiences with the Basket Peg
We would like to share how Singapore operationalizes the basket peg framework 
proposed in Kawai’s paper.
40 Since 1981, monetary policy in Singapore has been 
centered on management of the exchange rate.
41 The primary objective has been to
promote price stability as a sound basis for sustainable economic growth (see
Robinson [2001]).
40. The experience of Singapore may not apply to other East Asian economies, because of differing circumstances.
41. The choice of the exchange rate as the intermediate target of monetary policy is predicated on the openness of the
Singapore economy to trade and capital flows, and implies that MAS cedes control over domestic interest rates.
In the context of free movement of capital, interest rates in Singapore are largely determined by foreign interest
rates and investor expectations of future movements in the Singapore dollar.A key feature of our exchange rate system is the basket peg. The Singapore dollar is
managed against a basket of currencies of 10–15 major trading partners. The various
currencies are weighted geometrically, with the weights varying with the extent of
Singapore’s trade dependence with that particular country. Reflecting MAS’ targeting
of the nominal effective exchange rate (NEER), Singapore’s trade-weighted exchange
rate has remained fairly stable.
42 Volatility as measured by the standard deviation of 
the NEER was significantly lower for the Singapore dollar compared to that of the
U.S. dollar and of the yen.
43 The standard deviation of the Singapore dollar NEER 
was 1.46 percent between 1981/I and 2001/I, compared to 3.45 percent for the U.S.
dollar and 4.82 percent for the yen. 
The movements of the Singapore dollar against major currencies, especially the
U.S. dollar, have been less volatile than the movements among the major currencies.
Indeed, the Singapore dollar has been less volatile with respect to the other currencies
than if it had been pegged to any of the main currencies. For example, if the
Singapore dollar were pegged against the U.S. dollar, the monthly standard deviation
against the yen and deutschemark would have been 3.42 percent and 3.27 percent,
respectively, instead of 2.99 percent and 2.92 percent. The “basket” characteristic 
of the managed float system has therefore also helped to mitigate some volatility as
compared to if the Singapore dollar were on a bilateral peg. 
V. Coping with Short-Term Volatility as Well as Currency
Misalignments
While Kawai has recommended a loose peg to the currency basket for East Asian
economies, the Singapore exchange rate framework contains elements of the BBC 
system, i.e., basket, band, and crawl regime (see Williamson [2000]). The MAS 
operates a managed float for the Singapore dollar, allowing the trade-weighted exchange
rate to fluctuate within an undisclosed policy band. In the short term, managing the
Singapore dollar within a band provides the flexibility to prevent volatility in the 
financial markets from adversely affecting the real economy, as evidenced for example
by the Asian crisis. During that period, MAS was able to widen policy bands as 
volatility increased in foreign exchange markets and subsequently narrow them when
some degree of calm had returned to the regional markets. The flexibility accorded 
by the band is pertinent in view of Singapore’s vulnerability to disturbances in the
international financial system (strong fundamentals notwithstanding), given our small,
open economy as well as our role as a financial center in Asia.
Another key feature of Singapore’s exchange rate system is the crawl. The exchange
rate policy band is periodically reviewed to ensure that it remains consistent with the
underlying fundamentals of the economy. Over the longer term, the managed float 
has provided the flexibility for MAS to prevent currency misalignments by allowing
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42. In relation to the endogeneity of a currency regime, the stability in the Singapore dollar could very well reflect the
strong fundamentals underlying the Singapore economy. 
43. The NEER series for the U.S. dollar and yen are based on the quarterly series published by the International
Monetary Fund.the equilibrium (real) value of the exchange rate to reflect changes in underlying 
fundamentals, such as the trend increase in the savings rate and higher productivity 
in the export sector. Notably, the trade-weighted Singapore dollar has been on a 
secularly appreciating trend since 1981 in both nominal and real terms. This uptrend
has helped to keep inflationary pressures in check. Between 1981 and 1987, domestic
inflation averaged 2.3 percent, markedly less than external inflation (as proxied by 
a trade-weighted average of foreign composite consumer price index [CPI]), which
averaged 4.6 percent over the same period.
In addition, we have a semiannual exchange rate policy cycle. In January and July
each year, we release our Monetary Policy Statement and publish the Macroeconomic
Review. The latter is aimed at providing information on the background economic
analysis and assessment of GDP growth and inflation developments in the Singapore
economy, thereby sharing the basis for policy decisions articulated in the Monetary
Policy Statement.
VI. A Multi-Dimensional Approach to Exchange Rate
Management
It is generally recognized and can be inferred from Kawai’s paper that the challenges
posed by the global financial markets cannot be met by the choice of exchange rate
regime alone. Exchange rate policy management has moved beyond the confines of
the traditional parameters of instruments, targets, transmission mechanisms, and
inflation-output trade-off issues, and needs to be supported by a framework of 
consistent macroeconomic and microeconomic policies, and by strong institutions.
The exchange rate system may therefore be viewed as a “monetary overlay” on the
real economy foundations.
We have identified the following five aspects of an exchange rate support structure
(see Robinson [2001]):
(1) Sound and credible macroeconomic policies are essential to avoid the buildup
of major macro imbalances in the economy. This will reduce the vulnerability
to speculative attacks by preventing misalignments in the value of the currency. 
(2) The flexibility of the product and factor markets is essential to cope with and
adjust to shocks arising from the volatility of currency markets and swings 
in the terms of trade in world product markets. This is particularly true for
small, open economies, which are dependent on exports of goods and services. 
(3) It is crucial to develop and strengthen financial systems to enhance robustness
to shocks. A sound and efficient banking system, together with deep and liquid
capital markets, contributes to the efficient intermediation of financial flows.
This will help prevent the emergence of vulnerabilities in the financial system
by minimizing unsound lending practices that could lead to the buildup of
excessive leveraging in the corporate sector and exposure to foreign borrowings.  
(4) Countries need to build up their regulatory and supervisory capabilities to
keep pace with financial innovations and the growing complexity of financial
institutions’ activities, as well as new products and services.
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help to foster market discipline, as well as reduce the likelihood of markets
over-reacting due to lack of information or information asymmetries.
VII. Monetary Integration in East Asia
We conclude with a brief comment on Kawai’s suggestion for a move toward a 
common basket peg for East Asia. First, we agree with him that East Asia is not yet
ready for a monetary union. This is especially so given the relatively wide divergences
in economic characteristics such as GDP per capita, business cycle synchronization,
and price and wage flexibility in this region. Empirical evidence revealing asymmetric
shocks also suggests that this region currently does not meet the necessary prerequisites
for monetary integration (see, e.g., Chow and Kim [2003]).
Asian countries should focus their efforts instead on deepening the integration of
their markets. This would include developing greater intra-regional trade linkages,
integrating financial markets, and establishing regional production networks.
Underpinning this should be an evolution of common codes of conduct and 
standards of corporate governance, as well as greater regulatory cooperation and 
harmonization. Perhaps in the longer term, when Asia has achieved a certain degree
of integration in its factor and capital markets, some form of closer monetary 
cooperation and integration can be an effective means of securing the benefits of the
economic linkages.
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Masahiro Kawai’s paper tackles challenging topics, and I really appreciate his devoted
efforts to map this uncharted territory. Before commenting on his paper, I would like
to summarize its principal line of thought. 
First, the paper claims that the dollar remains the de facto anchor currency even 
in the post-crisis period, in spite of the shortcomings of the dollar-peg regime that
prevailed before the crisis. 
Second, such de facto predominance of the dollar does not reflect the underlying
trade patterns and foreign direct investment flows in the region, and is therefore 
sub-optimal.
Third, the emerging East Asian economies should adopt the “soft-peg” regime to the
currency basket, where the dollar, the yen, and the euro play equally important roles.
Fourth, given the above, greater coordination on the currency basket policy, an
enhanced surveillance mechanism, and the internationalization of the yen are desirable.
In my comments on the paper, first I would like to pose a question as to the 
interpretation of the existing trade patterns, focusing especially on the expansion of
intra-regional trade in East Asia. The interpretation is of essential importance in the
paper. For example, if the intra-regional trade expansion is driven by region-specific or
autonomous factors, excessive dependence on the dollar may be irrelevant. Conversely,
if such expansion is mainly driven by the U.S. economy, then predominance of the 
dollar may be inevitable.
Recently, economists at the Bank of Japan conducted joint research with econo-
mists from the European Central Bank on the intra- and inter-regional trade patterns
in East Asia (Isogai et al. [2002]). Their key finding was that intra-regional trade
expansion in East Asia is mainly induced by the U.S. economy. This result is in 
line with the intuition that East Asia has become an important production center 
for IT-related goods. If so, intra-regional trade expansion in East Asia may not be 
independent in nature.
This leads to the second question, of sub-optimality of the present regime. The 
paper claims that the present system is sub-optimal, because it does not reflect the
underlying trade patterns in the region. However, one may argue that the present 
system does in fact broadly reflect the reality of the real trade patterns. Given 
this reservation, I wonder how confidently one could argue for an intentional and
collective shift to a currency basket regime.
Third, I would like to call attention to financial factors in the choice of an
exchange rate regime. The role of the dollar is much larger in the context of financial
transactions than in the area of trade. The emerging East Asian economies borrow
money mainly in dollars for a number of reasons. We may assume this is one of the
reasons why they are particularly sensitive to the stability of their currencies vis-à-vis
the dollar. We should not underestimate such financial factors, particularly in the
wake of the currency crisis.
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regime cannot be completely immune from the well-known deficiencies of the 
peg system. Problems include how to define an optimal basket, how to design the
adjustment mechanism of the weights assigned to basket currencies, how to make 
it consistent with monetary policy and capital controls, and so on. Starting with a
mechanism that is not too rigid may be one idea. However, I wonder from a practical
viewpoint if such a soft and somewhat elusive regime is a meaningful departure from
the present mechanism.
Let us suppose that Japan can create an autonomous and independent business
cycle, and suppose further that Japan’s economic influence on the rest of the region
becomes dominant. In this case, a greater role played by the yen is conceivable.
Should we initiate such a shift of paradigm as public policy, or should we leave the
work to market forces in a broad sense? This may be the fundamental question.
In any event, designing an optimal currency regime requires a long process of 
trial and error, and continued effort. Here in East Asia, momentum is clearly build-
ing in pursuit of a better currency regime and improved monetary cooperation, and
policymakers should take advantage of such momentum. In this respect, the paper
provides us with a good reference point, as a catalyst for further discussion.
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Responding to the comments of the discussants, Masahiro Kawai, while acknowledg-
ing the importance of the removal of trade barriers, emphasized the need to develop
an exchange rate regime that would be conducive to intra-regional exchange rate 
stability. Responding to the comment that the region is heavily affected by the U.S.
economy as the source of final demand, he asserted that, given the rapid growth of
intra-regional trade, a dollar peg would give rise to problems in the event of large
fluctuations in the yen-dollar rate. While acknowledging the importance of financial
transactions, Kawai argued that, given the very high dependence of Asian countries
on trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), it was important to discuss desirable
exchange rate regimes from the perspective of international trade and investment.
In the general discussion that followed, Asian participants generally expressed
views in support of currency basket arrangements and agreed with Kawai’s analysis.
Jeong-Ho Hahm (The Bank of Korea) and Amara Sriphayak (Bank of Thailand)
acknowledged the usefulness of currency basket arrangements in simultaneously
achieving exchange rate stability and price stability. Han Ming Zhi noted his support
for currency basket arrangements, subject to the appropriate choice of currency composition in such baskets. Robert W. Rankin commented that Kawai’s empirical
results for the first half of 2002 suggest that Korea and Thailand, like Singapore, were
already operating under a currency basket during this period.
Various criticisms of currency basket arrangements were also voiced. Gabriele
Galati, Chow Hwee Kwan, and Ismail Alowi agreed with the statement of Eiji 
Hirano that the importance of the dollar in current account and capital transactions
should be taken into consideration. Alowi and Reuven Glick noted that currency 
basket arrangements lacked transparency because information regarding the relative
weights of the currencies in a basket and determination of the fluctuation bands often
were not disclosed. Vittorio Corbo noted that during the past two years, there were no 
cases of successful intermediate exchange rate regimes outside of Asia. He then 
argued that to pursue real exchange rate stability from the perspective of international
competitiveness alone would not be consistent with the goal of price stability.
The following comments were made concerning the empirical analysis of the 
presentation. Robert H. Rasche (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) noted that the
reduced-form equations used in the estimation were subject to simultaneous bias, 
so that due caution needed to be exercised in applying the results based on such
equations to policy recommendations concerning the choice of exchange rate
regimes. Corbo argued that countries with capital-flow controls should be excluded
from the analysis and emerging market economies should be the study’s focus.
Hiroshi Fujiki commented that, given the fact that certain aspects of the “original-sin
hypothesis” are applicable to the Asian countries, it is necessary to include both
exchange rates and foreign reserves in the analysis. 
Commenting on Kawai’s assertion that Singapore represented an almost ideal
form of currency basket arrangement, Corbo, Glick, and Alowi stated that
Singapore’s success was based on its favorable fundamentals, and that it was doubtful
whether the arrangement would work in other countries. Chow responded that,
notwithstanding favorable fundamentals, a small and open economy was prone to 
be affected by currency crises in other countries. Kawai responded that, although 
pre-crisis fundamentals were believed to be strong, there were currency crises, 
which suggested the need to adopt an exchange rate regime that is less prone to a 
crisis. Also, such a regime should be supported by consistent monetary policy, sound
fiscal policy, and a resilient financial sector, as in the case of Singapore. The Asian
region experienced a currency crisis and contagion effects. Rankin commented 
that, although the impact of the East Asian crisis on Singapore was reduced by 
the depreciation of its currency, if all countries of the region were to depreciate 
their currencies in the event of another crisis, foreign exchange adjustment would 
be impossible in Asia as a whole.
Comments were also made from a more long-term perspective. Allan H. Meltzer
emphasized the importance of the Chinese economy in considering the future of East
Asian exchange rate regimes. Jerry L. Jordan (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)
stated that the elimination of the causes of currency crises requires governments to
improve governance. Jordan also commented that Kawai’s paper failed to present a
theoretical model to explain how a specific currency comes to be widely accepted as a
regional currency. Jorge A. Braga de Macedo pointed out that Kawai’s paper did not
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East Asia. He also emphasized that an institutional framework must be developed to
avoid future financial crises and to promote regional cooperation. Kawai responded
that while a recent attempt to create the Chiang Mai Initiative was a significant 
step forward, East Asian regional frameworks for exchanges of information, policy 
dialogue, and economic surveillance were relatively underdeveloped given the degree
of regional economic integration, and it was important to start a dialogue process on
exchange rate movements and policies.
Given the important bearing of foreign exchange fluctuations on the discussions
of this session, Meltzer asked Hirano to explain why the Bank of Japan undertakes
sterilization when intervening in the foreign exchange market. Hirano responded that
there was no effective difference between sterilization and non-sterilization because
the Bank of Japan, under the so-called quantitative easing framework, was targeting
outstanding current account balances of banks with the Bank of Japan, which 
effectively created the zero interest rate environment.
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